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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW1
1.

Did Judge Quinn properly comply, on remand, with this Court's prior

decision in McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, 220 P.3d 146 ("McLaughlin F\ in ruling
that he could consider options other than a fairness hearing - namely, disinterested
directors' and shareholders' actions under Section 851 of the Utah Revised Business
Corporation Act (the "Corporation Act") - for resolving the "nontransaction conflict[] of
interest" situation at issue? 2009 UT 64, \ 36 n.6. This issue was preserved in the trial
court. (See R2760, R2996, R3486.)
Standard of Review: Whether Judge Quinn properly complied, on remand, with
this Court's decision in McLaughlin I is a question of law that is reviewed for
correctness. See Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
2.

In ruling that he could consider options other than a fairness hearing for

resolving the nontransaction conflict of interest situation, did Judge Quinn overrule a
decision of the prior judge in this case (Judge Hilder) in violation of the law of the case
doctrine? This issue was preserved in the trial court. (See R3017-18, R3340-42.)
Standard of Review: To the extent McLaughlin suggests that this issue should be
reviewed for correctness (see Aplt.'s Brief at 2), he is wrong. A challenge to a judge's
1

As used herein, "McLaughlin" refers to Appellant Samuel R. McLaughlin;
"Cookietree" refers to Appellee Cookietree, Inc.; "Appellees" refers collectively to
Cookietree and Appellee Greg Schenk.
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reversal of a ruling made by a predecessor judge, on the ground that the reversal violated
the law of the case doctrine, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.2 See In re
R.B.F.S., 2012 UT App 132, lj 8, 278 P.3d 143.
3.

Has McLaughlin asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim in this lawsuit

based on the actions of Cookietree's disinterested director and shareholders to ratify the
nontransaction conflict of interest situation (collectively, the "2009 Ratifications"), and if
so, did the disinterested director and shareholders breach their fiduciary duties to
McLaughlin by executing the 2009 Ratifications, notwithstanding that such actions are
expressly authorized by McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act?

These issues were

preserved in the trial court. (See R3003-04, R3359-62, R3375.)
Standard of Review: Whether McLaughlin has a breach of fiduciary duty claim in
this lawsuit and if so, whether the disinterested director and shareholders breached their
fiduciary duties to McLaughlin present questions of law that are reviewed for correctness.
See McLaughlin I9 2009 UT 64, ^ 14.
4.

Did Judge Quinn correctly determine that the 2009 Ratifications complied

with the requirements set forth in McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act for resolving
nontransaction conflict of interest situations and that, consequently, Appellees were

2

As noted above concerning issue 1, the substance of Judge Quinn's ruling - that
he could consider options other than a fairness hearing for resolving the nontransaction
conflict of interest situation - is reviewed for correctness. See In re R.B.F.S., 2012 UT
App 1324 8, 278 P.3d 143.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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entitled to summary judgment?

This issue was preserved in the trial court.

(See

R2950-3018, R3315-66, R3487.)
Standard of Review:

This Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary

judgment for correctness. See Rawsonv. Conover, 2001 UT 24, ^25, 20 P.3d 876.
However, this Court need only determine (1) whether the trial court erred in applying the
governing law, and (2) whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed
issues of material fact. See Glover ex rel Dyson v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923 P.2d 1383,
1385 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Statutes that are of central importance to this appeal are as follows, and copies
thereof are attached as Addendum 1: Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-850, -851, -852, -853.
A copy of the McLaughlin I decision is attached as Addendum 2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The underlying dispute in this case involves a sale of Cookietree common stock.
Specifically, on August 16, 1999, the Estate of Boyd Schenk, administered by
Anna Schenk (Boyd Schenk's wife at the time of his death), sold 545,200 shares of
Cookietree common stock to Greg Schenk (Boyd Schenk's son) (the "1999 Stock Sale").
(R3481.)
The 1999 Stock Sale did not - despite McLaughlin's suggestion to the contrary give "Greg Schenk majority control of Cookietree, Inc."

(Aplt.'s Brief at 10.)

Greg Schenk became the majority shareholder (based on the total number of issued and
outstanding shares) more than a year before the 1999 Stock Sale - on April 1, 1998 -

71794486.10061604-00002
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when Boyd Schenk sold 818,000 shares to Greg Schenk.

This transaction is not

challenged by McLaughlin. Thus the 1999 Stock Sale did not result in a change of
control of Cookietree; Greg Schenk was already the majority shareholder. (R2723-26.)
Approximately six years after the 1999 Stock Sale, in November 2005,
McLaughlin - a minority shareholder and former employee of Cookietree - commenced
the instant lawsuit, in which he alleged that the 1999 Stock Sale was made in violation of
certain transfer restriction provisions contained in an agreement among the shareholders
of Cookietree (the "1991 Shareholders' Agreement"), because it was technically not
between "immediate family" members.4

After the April 1, 1998 stock sale, Greg Schenk owned 61.04 percent of the
issued and outstanding shares of Cookietree (R2723); after the 1999 Stock Sale, he
owned 70.39 percent of the issued and outstanding shares (R2726). McLaughlin's
argument that the 1999 Stock Sale "gave Greg Schenk majority control of Cookietree" is
apparently based on the total number of "authorized" shares, not the total number of
issued and outstanding shares. McLaughlin's reference to the number of authorized
shares, however, does not make sense. Authorized shares in articles of incorporation
simply refer to the number of shares that the corporation is authorized to issue.
Everything in the Corporation Act that deals with a percentage of shares refers to shares
outstanding, not shares authorized. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-721(l) deals
with voting entitlement of shares, and is clearly based on outstanding shares: "[E]ach
outstanding share, regardless of class, is entitled to one vote . . . on each matter voted on
at a shareholders' meeting."
4

The 1991 Shareholders' Agreement provides, in pertinent part:
If any Shareholder desires or is required to sell any Shares, or
if any Shares would be transferred by operation of law or
otherwise, then the Shareholder (or his successor in interest)
shall first offer the Shares to Cookietree, by written notice to
Cookietree.
(continued . ..)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
A may contain errors.

On May 17, 2005, to remove any question as to the validity of the 1999 Stock
Sale, Cookietree's Board of Directors (the "Board"), of which Greg Schenk was a
member, waived the application of the transfer restriction provisions in the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement to the 1999 Stock Sale, as expressly permitted by the 1991
Shareholders9 Agreement (the "2005 Board Waiver"). (R3481.)

(. . . continued)
In the event that Cookietree does not elect to acquire
all of the Shares specified in the selling Shareholder's notice,
the secretary of Cookietree shall, within thirty (30) days of
receipt of a selling Shareholder's notice, give written notice
thereof to the Shareholders other than the selling
Shareholder. . . . Each of the other Shareholders shall be
entitled to purchase that proportion of the shares available for
purchase.
Anything to the contrary contained herein
notwithstanding . . . , each of Greg F. Schenk [and] BoydF.
Schenk . . . (but not their transferees or successors in interest)
may transfer Shares to no more than five members of such
Shareholder's immediate family . . ., either during his lifetime
or on death by will or intestacy. . . . "Immediate family" as
used herein shall mean spouse, lineal descendant, father or
mother of the Shareholder making such transfer.
The provisions of this Agreement may be waived with
respect to any transfer either by Cookietree, upon duly
authorized action of its Board of Directors, or by the
Shareholders, upon the express written consent of the
owners of at least two-thirds of the Shares then subject to
this Agreement (excluding those Shares owned by the
selling Shareholder).
(R2803-07 (emphasis added).)

71794486.10061604-00002
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On the same day, the owners of approximately 90 percent of the issued and
outstanding shares of Cookietree, as of the date of the 1999 Stock Sale, executed a
similar waiver, again, as expressly permitted by the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement (the
"2005 Shareholders' Waiver").

(R3481-82.)

(The 2005 Board and Shareholders'

Waivers are referred to, collectively, as the "2005 Waivers.")
In McLaughlin /, this Court determined that the 2005 Waivers did not violate the
Corporation Act or Cookietree's bylaws, 2009 UT 64, ^[31 ("We disagree that the
waivers were enacted without authority, were untimely, or were in violation of
Cookietree's bylaws or of statutory conflict of interest provisions . . . ."), but that they
"were tainted by a conflict of interest because they were both executed by Greg Schenk,
who clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer restrictions of the
shareholder agreement," id. TJ38. This Court made clear, however, that Greg Schenk's
conflict of interest did not automatically invalidate the 2005 Waivers, and adopted new
procedures for resolving the "nontransaction conflict[] of interest" situation.5
Specifically, this Court determined that a nontransaction conflict situation, like the
one at issue here, may be resolved by any one of the three options set forth in Section 851
5

In McLaughlin /, this Court determined that the Corporation Act did not apply to
the 2005 Waivers because they were not a "transaction" within the meaning of the
statute, which is why the Court referred to the 2005 Waivers as a "nontransaction
conflict[] of interest" situation. 2009 UT 64, ^ 36 n.6; see also id. ^ 35 ("The waiver, as
enacted by the board of directors, was a unilateral action by Cookietree, not a 'deal';
therefore, it is not subject to the conflict of interest statute."). However, the Court
determined that the procedures provided in the Corporation Act for resolving transactionrelated conflicts of interest may also be used to resolve nontransaction-related conflicts of
interest, like the 2005 Waivers. See id. f 37.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the Corporation Act: (1) disinterested directors may vote to ratify the conflict
situation, (2) disinterested shareholders may vote to ratify the conflict situation, or (3) the
party with a conflict may show that the situation was fair. Id. ^37 (emphasis added).
This Court then remanded "for a determination of whether . . . [the 2005 Waivers] were
fair."

Id. *f[31.

Importantly, this Court did not foreclose or prohibit Cookietree's

disinterested director or shareholders (who are not parties to this litigation) from taking
action, in accordance with the new McLaughlin I framework and Section 851 of the
Corporation Act, to ratify the 2005 Waivers and thereby cure the nontransaction conflict
of interest situation.
Thus, following McLaughlin I, in the Board's December 2009 meeting and the
shareholders' 2009 annual meeting (held in January 2010), each of Cookietree's
disinterested director and shareholders (after full disclosure by Greg Schenk) took action
to resolve the conflict of interest that tainted the 2005 Waivers.

Specifically,

David Rudd, as the sole disinterested director, and the owners of a majority of
Cookietree's disinterested shares, respectively, voted to ratify the 2005 Waivers (as
defined above, the "2009 Ratifications"). (R3483.) As required by McLaughlin I mid the
Corporation Act, Greg Schenk did not participate in the 2009 Ratifications. (R3483-85.)
On January 14, 2010, McLaughlin filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
that the 2009 Ratifications were ineffective, and that a jury - not Cookietree's
disinterested director and shareholders - should decide whether the 2005 Waivers were

71794486.1 0061604-00002
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fair.

(R1876.) Essentially, McLaughlin argued, relying on the remand directive in

McLaughlin /, that the 2009 Ratifications simply had to be ignored by the trial court.
Greg Schenk and Cookietree filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
2009 Ratifications cured the conflict of interest identified in McLaughlin I as a matter of
law, and consequently, there was no need to conduct a fairness hearing. (Rl882-85.)
On September 9, 2010, Judge Hilder entered an order on the parties' cross-motions
for summary judgment. (R2370.) Judge Hilder determined that he would simply ignore
the 2009 Ratifications and convene a fairness hearing. (R2374.) Judge Hilder did not
decide the precise form the fairness hearing would take, whether legal argument or
evidentiary, but stated: "in the event there are no disputed facts, an evidentiary hearing
would not be necessary." (R2373.) Greg Schenk and Cookietree petitioned this Court
for permission to appeal Judge Hilder's interlocutory order, which petition was assigned
to the Court of Appeals. (R2377.) The Court of Appeals denied the petition. (R2383.)
Before a fairness hearing was convened, Judge Hilder retired and the case was
assigned to Judge Quinn. On May 17, 2011, Judge Quinn held a status conference to
discuss, among other issues, how the parties should proceed. At the conclusion of the
hearing, Judge Quinn indicated that, after reviewing McLaughlin /, he believed
Judge Hilder had incorrectly interpreted the remand directive:
I'm certainly not going to take the same position that Judge
Hilder did. The efforts to remedy what took place in 2005
6

McLaughlin has argued that he is entitled to a jury trial to determine fairness,
notwithstanding that fairness is an equitable determination. {See R2446.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have no effect on what ultimately happens in this case
because I'm not convinced that that's the case. I think that
the corporation can try and fix it. Whether they've effectively
fixed it or not, I don't know, but I think that they can . . . . So
why don't we invite [Cookietree and Greg Schenk] to file a
motion for summary judgment that addresses all of those
issues.
(R3502atll.)
On June 30, 2011, in accordance with Judge Quinn's instruction, Greg Schenk and
Cookietree filed a motion for summary judgment. (R2705.) In the motion, Greg Schenk
and Cookietree argued that, as a result of the 2009 Ratifications, a judicial determination
regarding the fairness of the 2005 Waivers was unnecessary, because the 2009
Ratifications effectively cured the conflict of interest identified in McLaughlin I.
Greg Schenk and Cookietree further argued that to the extent a judicial determination of
fairness concerning the 2005 Waivers was required, based upon the undisputed facts, the
2005 Waivers were fair to Cookietree and its shareholders as a matter of law.
On November 17, 2011, Judge Quinn granted Greg Schenk and Cookietree's
motion for summary judgment, in part. Specifically, Judge Quinn determined that:
•

Nowhere in McLaughlin I did this Court prohibit Cookietree's disinterested
director and/or disinterested shareholders from taking action pursuant to the
Corporation Act to resolve Greg Schenk's conflict of interest, nor does
McLaughlin I explain why such action would be unavailable in this case.

•

He had discretion to consider options other than a fairness hearing under
McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act - namely, the 2009 Ratifications - for
resolving the nontransaction conflict of interest situation.

71794486.10061604-00002
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•

There is no material question of fact concerning the circumstances surrounding the
2009 Ratifications, or the content of disclosures made to the disinterested director
and shareholders in connection therewith, and thus he could decide the validity of
the 2009 Ratifications at the summary judgment stage.

•

The 2009 Ratifications complied with the framework for resolving nontransaction
conflict of interest situations set forth in McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act,
and thus completely resolved the conflict of interest that tainted the 2005 Waivers.

(R3481.)
McLaughlin now appeals from Judge Quinn's order granting summary judgment
in favor of Appellees. McLaughlin seeks to have this Court reverse Judge Quinn's order
and remand the case for a fairness hearing, notwithstanding that all of Cookietree's
shareholders as of the date of the 1999 Stock Sale (with the exception of McLaughlin and
his wife), all of Cookietree's current disinterested shareholders (with the exception of
McLaughlin and his wife), all of the directors in 2005, and the current disinterested
director have indicated, by their votes in favor of the 2005 Waivers and the 2009
Ratifications, that the 2005 Waivers were fair to Cookietree and its shareholders
generally.

No shareholder (or director), except for McLaughlin and his wife, has

suggested otherwise.
Essentially, McLaughlin is arguing that Cookietree's disinterested director and
shareholders should not be able to decide for themselves whether the 2005 Waivers were
fair (as provided for in the Corporation Act); instead, a jury should make the
determination for them. This argument does not comport with McLaughlin I or the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Corporation Act. It should not be the province of the courts to second-guess (or ignore)
such ratifications. Indeed, the Corporation Act is clear that if disinterested directors' or
shareholders' action is taken (both were taken here) to ratify a nontransaction conflict of
interest situation, the situation "may not be enjoined, be set aside, or give rise to an award
of damages or other sanctions" as a matter of law. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851(2).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following is a statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review:
The Board's Post-Remand Actions
On December 18, 2009, following McLaughlin I, Cookietree held a meeting of its
Board.

The

Board

members

were

Greg Schenk,

Cookietree's

President;

Harold Rosemann, Cookietree's Chief Financial Officer; and David Rudd, who is not
(and never has been) employed by Cookietree. (R2859 (Minutes of Dec. 18, 2009 Board
Meeting, attached as Addendum 3).)
Prior to the meeting, David Rudd analyzed and reviewed documentation
containing all of the material facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers,
including, but not limited to, the 2005 Waivers themselves, the 1991 Shareholders'
Agreement, Cookietree's financial statements and other financial information, and this
Court's decision in McLaughlin I. (R3483.)
At the meeting, the Board discussed the 1999 Stock Sale, the 2005 Waivers, and
this Court's holding in McLaughlin I that the 2005 Waivers were tainted because
Greg Schenk had a conflict of interest.

(R2859.)

Greg Schenk acknowledged the

personal benefit he would receive from the ratification of the 2005 Waivers and from the
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authorization and approval of a new waiver, and that such personal benefit created a
conflict of interest. (Id.) Greg Schenk stated that pursuant to McLaughlin I, he would
abstain from voting on any action concerning the ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver
and the authorization of a current Board waiver. (Id.)
McLaughlin has consistently argued in this litigation that Harold Rosemann has a
professional or employment relationship with Greg Schenk that creates a conflict of
interest for him in voting on any Board ratification concerning the 2005 Waivers, and
understanding McLaughlin's position, Harold Rosemann stated during the Board meeting
that he also would abstain from voting on the issue of the ratification of the 2005 Board
Waiver and the authorization of a current Board waiver. (R2859-60.)
Thus, David Rudd, as the sole disinterested director, after full disclosure by
Greg Schenk, adopted the following resolutions:
(a)

ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver (the "2009 Board Ratification"); and

(b)

present waiver of the transfer restriction provisions in the 1991
Shareholders'Agreement to the 1999 Stock Sale.

(R2860, R3483-84.) Neither Greg Schenk nor Harold Rosemann participated in these
actions.

(R2860 (Minutes of Dec. 18, 2009 Board Meeting ("GregF. Schenk and

Harold W. Rosemann abstained from voting on the foregoing resolutions and David R.
Rudd voted in favor of the resolutions."))-)
After David Rudd took the foregoing actions on behalf of Cookietree, all three
directors then voted to ratify the actions taken by David Rudd to ratify the 2005 Board
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Waiver and to presently waive the transfer restriction provisions in the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement to the 1999 Stock Sale. (R2860-61.)
All three directors also voted to set the time and place of the 2009 annual
shareholders' meeting and resolved that the matters of business to come before the
shareholders included, among other things:
(a)

The present waiver by the shareholders of the transfer restriction provisions
in the

1991 Shareholders'

Agreement

to the

1999 Stock

Sale

("Proposal 1"); and
(b)

Ratification of the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver and the current shareholders'
waiver contemplated in Proposal 1 ("Proposal 2").

(R2861.)
The Shareholders'Post-Remand Actions
On December 21, 2009, Cookietree's corporate secretary sent all of the
shareholders of Cookietree (including McLaughlin) a notice of the 2009 annual
shareholders' meeting (which was to be held on January 6, 2010), an infonnation
statement concerning Proposals 1 and 2 (the "Disclosure Statement"), and a proxy.
(R3484.)

(A copy of the notice, Disclosure Statement, and proxy are attached as

Addendum 4.)
The Disclosure Statement set forth all material facts concerning the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement, the transfer restriction provisions, the 1999 Stock Sale, the
2005 Waivers, Greg Schenk's conflict of interest and the circumstances surrounding this
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litigation, and this Court's decision in McLaughlin L

A copy of the McLaughlin I

decision was provided to all shareholders with the Disclosure Statement. (R3484.)
The Disclosure Statement stated that, in deciding how to vote on Proposals 1 and
2, each shareholder "should consider, among other things, whether the 2005
Shareholders'] Waiver and the 20[09] Shareholders'] Waiver of the Transfer Restriction
Provisions are fair to the Company and the Shareholders." (R2874.)
At the 2009 shareholders' meeting, shareholders owning 4,113,400 shares of the
common stock of Cookietree were present, in person or by proxy, out of the
4,124,650 shares issued, outstanding, and entitled to vote at the meeting. With respect to
Proposal 1 - to presently waive the transfer restriction provisions in the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement to the 1999 Stock Sale - 3,168,200 shares were voted in favor
of the proposal and 400,000 shares (all owned by McLaughlin and his wife) were voted
against.

(R2881 (Minutes of 2009 Annual Shareholders Meeting, attached as

Addendum 5.) This 3,168,200 shares did not include the shares at issue in the 1999
Stock Sale, but did include Greg Schenk's remaining shares, pursuant to the waiver
requirements of the 1991 Shareholders'Agreement. (Id.)
Paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement requires that any waiver of the
provisions thereof given by the shareholders be given by "the express written consent of
the owners of at least two-thirds of the [s]hares then subject to th[e] Agreement
(excluding those [s]hares owned by the selling shareholder)."

(R2807.)

Thus, to

constitute a waiver by the shareholders, Proposal 1 needed to be approved by not less
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than two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding shares, including Greg Schenk's
shares, other than the shares at issue in the 1999 Stock Sale.
However, because of Greg Schenk's conflict of interest, the shareholders were
specifically told in the Disclosure Statement that Proposal 1 would only be approved if
(in addition to being approved by two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding shares
other than the shares at issue in the 1999 Stock Sale) it was also approved by
"shareholders owning a majority of the [s]hares . . . that constitute 'qualified shares'
under the Business Corporation Act."7 (R2872.) For this reason, the vote on Proposal 1
was tallied in two different ways: one tally including Greg Schenk's shares other than
the shares at issue in the 1999 Stock Sale; the other tally excluding all of his shares.
With regard to the first tally, the Inspector of Election/Voting Judge announced at
the shareholders' meeting that 3,168,200 shares were voted in favor of Proposal 1 and
400,000 shares (all owned by McLaughlin and his wife) were voted against Proposal 1.
The Inspector of Election/Voting Judge also announced that 987,000 "qualified shares"
(shares excluding all those owned by Greg Schenk) were voted in favor of Proposal 1
and 400,000 "qualified shares" (all owned by McLaughlin and his wife) were voted
against Proposal 1.

(R2885 (Certificate and Report of Inspector of Election/Voting

Judge, attached as Addendum 6).) Thus Proposal 1 was approved by the owners of at
n

"Qualified shares" are defined in the Corporation Act as "one or more shares
entitled to vote on the transaction, except a share" that is beneficially owned, or the
voting of which is controlled, by: "(i) a director who has a conflicting interest respecting
the transaction; (ii) a related person of that director; or (iii) a person referred to in
Subsections (27)(b)(i) and (ii)." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-102(27).
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least two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding shares as required by the 1991
Shareholders' Agreements and by shareholders owning a majority of the "qualified" or
disinterested shares as required by McLaughlin I (the "2009 Shareholders' Waiver").
(R2885-86,R3485.)
With respect to Proposal 2 - to ratify the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver - 987,000
"qualified shares" (shares excluding all those owned by Greg Schenk as required by
McLaughlin I) were voted in favor of Proposal 2 and 400,000 "qualified shares" (all
owned by McLaughlin and his wife) were voted against. (R2887.) It was noted at the
meeting that Greg Schenk did not vote any of his shares on Proposal 2. (R2882.) It
was thus resolved that the owners of a majority of the disinterested or "qualified" shares
ratified (1) the 2005 Shareholders' Waiver, and (2) the 2009 Shareholders' Waiver (the
"2009 Shareholders'Ratification"). (R2882, R3485.)
Ignoring the foregoing facts, McLaughlin persists on appeal with in his erroneous
argument that the 2009 Board and shareholder actions are virtually identical to the 2005
Waivers, which were tainted by Greg Schenk's conflict of interest.

McLaughlin's

argument reflects confusion on his part concerning the nature of the 2009 Board and
shareholder actions.

The 2005 Board and shareholder actions consisted merely of

executing contractual waivers concerning the 1999 Stock Sale as permitted by the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement.

Although the Board and shareholders again executed the

requisite contractual waivers in 2009, the disinterested or "qualified" director and the
"qualified" shareholders also took action pursuant to the McLaughlin I decision and
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applicable provisions of the Corporation Act to ratify the 2005 Waivers, and thus resolve
Greg Schenk's conflict of interest. Such action was not taken in 2005.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Judge Quinn correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, and
McLaughlin's arguments to the contrary are without merit.
McLaughlin's first and primary argument is that McLaughlin I required that Judge
Quinn close his eyes to the 2009 Ratifications and convene a trial to determine whether
the 2005 Waivers were fair, despite the fact that Cookietree's disinterested director and
shareholders had clearly indicated - by their votes in favor of the 2009 Ratifications
(after full disclosure of all material facts) - that the 2005 Waivers were fair. Judge Quinn
correctly rejected this argument. McLaughlin I specifically authorized (not prohibited)
disinterested directors' or shareholders' action as a means of resolving nontransaction
conflict of interest situations. Not even McLaughlin disputes this. And McLaughlin I did
not explain why such ratifications would be legally irrelevant or prohibited in this case,
as they had not occurred (or even been contemplated) at the time of McLaughlin L Thus
Judge Quinn's ruling - that he had discretion to consider options other than a fairness
hearing (namely, the 2009 Ratifications) for resolving the conflict of interest at issue complied with (not contravened) McLaughlin L
McLaughlin next argues that Judge Quinn was bound by the law of the case
doctrine to follow JudgeHilder's interpretation of McLaughlin!.

McLaughlin

misanalyzes the law of the case doctrine. While a case remains pending before the
district court, the parties are bound by the court's prior decisions, but the court remains
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free to reconsider any of its prior decisions, regardless of whether the judge has changed
or remained the same throughout the proceedings. Thus Judge Quinn was not prohibited
from reconsidering Judge Hilder's ruling.

Judge Quinn operated well within his

discretion and did not violate the law of the case.
McLaughlin next argues that the actions of Cookietree's disinterested director and
shareholders to ratify the 2005 Waivers somehow violated the "duty of good faith and
fair dealing" owed by directors and stockholders in close corporations. This argument
fails for the simple reason that McLaughlin has not asserted a breach of fiduciary duty
claim against Cookietree's disinterested director and shareholders (or anyone else) based
on the 2009 Ratifications.

Such a cause of action was not pled in McLaughlin's

complaint, nor has it been asserted via an amendment to the complaint, and McLaughlin
cannot assert this new cause of action on appeal. Regardless, such a claim would fail on
the merits, because Cookietree's disinterested director and shareholders could not have
breached their fiduciary duties to McLaughlin, as a matter of law, by voting in favor of
ratifications (after full disclosure of all material facts) that are expressly authorized by
McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act,
Finally, McLaughlin's argument that the 2009 Ratifications did not comply with
the framework set forth in McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act, and that Judge Quinn
should not have granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, fails for the following
reasons:
•

Greg Schenk did not participate in the 2009 Ratifications - McLaughlin's
argument to the contrary is factually and indisputably wrong.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

As the sole disinterested director, David Rudd's affirmative vote in favor of the
2009 Board Ratification constituted a majority of the "qualified" directors entitled
to vote thereon, and therefore the requirement of director action in a conflicting
interest situation was satisfied. The Corporation Act expressly "permits a single
qualified director to approve another director's conflicting interest transaction."
Official Commentary to Corporation Act § 852(a) (emphasis added). Regardless,
even if the 2009 Board Ratification were somehow invalid (which it is not), the
2009 Shareholders' Ratification is independently valid.

•

There is no material question of fact concerning the circumstances surrounding the
2009 Ratifications, or the content of disclosures made to the disinterested director
and shareholders in connection therewith.
ARGUMENT

I.

Judge Quinn Complied with McLaughlin I in Ruling That He Could Consider
Options Other Than a Fairness Hearing - Namely, the 2009 Ratifications for Resolving the Nontransaction Conflict of Interest Situation at Issue.
McLaughlin argues that McLaughlin I precluded Cookietree's disinterested

director and shareholders (who are not parties to this litigation) from taking action under
McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act to ratify the 2005 Waivers, and also precluded
Judge Quinn from taking any course other than convening a fairness hearing.
McLaughlin is plainly wrong.
The mandate rule holds that "when an appellate court makes a pronouncement on
a legal issue, the lower court must not depart from the mandate." Jensen v. IHC Hosps.,
Inc., 2003 UT 51, ^f 67, 82 P.3d 1076 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation
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omitted).

This Court, however, did not make any pronouncement in McLaughlin I

regarding the 2009 Ratifications, because they had not yet occurred.

The 2009

Ratifications occurred after (and in response to) the McLaughlin I decision.

And

McLaughlin I does not explain why ratifications by Cookietree's disinterested director
and/or shareholders post-remand would be (or could be) prohibited, considering the
disinterested director and shareholders are not parties to this action. There is nothing in
McLaughlin I or the Corporation Act suggesting, even generally, that ratification may
only be attempted once, or that a corporation's disinterested directors and/or shareholders
cannot act to cure a defect in a previous ratification.
In arguing that this Court's remand directive must be observed "along with the
circumstances it embraces" (Aplt.'s Brief at 14), McLaughlin focuses solely on the last
sentence of paragraph 38 of the decision ("We therefore remand for a determination of
whether the waivers were fair within the meaning of Utah Code section
16-10a-851 . . . ."), but ignores that this Court also expressly adopted other procedures for
resolving nontransaction conflicts of interest. Specifically, McLaughlin I states that a
nontransaction conflict of interest, like the one at issue here, may be resolved, not just by
a fairness hearing, but by directors' action to ratify the conflict situation, or by
shareholders' action to ratify the conflict situation. See 2009 UT 64, <| 37. In adopting
these procedures, this Court recognized that many aspects of corporate governance are
unfair, and stated that "[t]he conflict of interest statute protects against such abuse, but
still preserves the ability of close corporations to operate by not invalidating every
transaction with a conflict of interest." Id. Thus, McLaughlin I specifically authorized
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(not prohibited) disinterested directors' or shareholders' action as a means of resolving
the conflict of interest that tainted the 2005 Waivers.
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Quinn's determination that he could consider
options other than a fairness hearing for resolving the nontransaction conflict of interest
situation at issue was legally (and manifestly) correct.
II.

In Ruling That He Could Consider the 2009 Ratifications, Judge Quinn Did
Not Overrule a Previous Decision by Judge Hilder in Violation of the Law of
the Case,
McLaughlin next contends that the law of the case doctrine prohibited

Judge Quinn from considering the 2009 Ratifications, because Judge Hilder had
previously declined to consider them. Judge Quinn, however, was not bound to follow
Judge Hilder's interpretation of the McLaughlin I decision.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the "[l]aw of the case does not prohibit a
district court judge from revisiting a previously decided issue during the course of a case,
regardless of whether the judge has changed or remained the same throughout the
proceedings" Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, If 11, 216 P.3d
352 (emphases added). This is true even when a second judge has taken over the case,
because "the two judges, while different persons, constitute a single judicial office." PC
Crane Serv., LLC v. McQueen Masonry, Inc., 2012 UT App 61, ^j 43, 273 P.3d 396
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Thus, the law of the case doctrine is not a limit on judicial power. Instead, "'the
doctrine allows a court to decline to revisit issues within the same case once the court has
ruled on them,5" but does not prohibit a court from reconsidering previously decided
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issues. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 2009 UT 43,1f 11 (quoting IHC Health Servs., Inc. v.
D&K Mgmt, 2008 UT 73, ^ 26, 196 P.3d 588); see also McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d
978, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (court can change ruling until final decision is formally
rendered; hence judge did not abuse discretion by rescinding prior decision to deny
partial summary judgment). This rule tracks with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),
which provides that prior to final judgment, "any order or other form of decision,
however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties." (Emphasis added.)
Ignoring the foregoing, McLaughlin argues that a judge may only revisit a prior
decision (1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling authority, (2) when
new evidence has become available, or (3) when the judge is convinced that his or her
prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. (Aplt.'s Brief
at 15.) In making this argument, McLaughlin misanalyzes the doctrine of law of the case.
As discussed above, the law of the case doctrine grants a judge discretion as to whether to
reopen a previously decided issue, even if none of the above circumstances are present;
but, if any of the above circumstances are present, the judge must revisit the decision.
See IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2008 UT 73, f 33 ("There are, however, exceptions to the
law of the case doctrine, which, if applicable, require a district court to revisit an issue it
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has already decided." (emphasis added)). Thus Judge Quinn did not need to rely on any
o

of the above "exceptions" in order to justify revisiting Judge Hilder's ruling.
Accordingly, Judge Quinn was free to revisit the applicability of the 2009
Ratifications even though the issue had been previously addressed by Judge Hilder.
Judge Quinn operated well within his discretion and did not violate the law of the case.
III.

McLaughlin Does Not Have a Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty;
Regardless, Such a Claim Would Fail Under the Facts of This Case.
McLaughlin next argues that the actions of Cookietree's disinterested director and

shareholders to ratify the 2005 Waivers violated the "duty of good faith and fair dealing"
owed by directors and stockholders in close corporations. This argument fails because
McLaughlin has not pled such a claim and cannot do so on appeal.
In his complaint, McLaughlin pled a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against
Greg Schenk, arguing that Greg Schenk breached the fiduciary duty he owed to
McLaughlin by terminating McLaughlin's employment and by executing the 2005
Waivers. McLaughlin later moved to amend his complaint to add two new defendants,
Harold Rosemann (a current director) and Gayle Schenk (a former director), and to assert
his breach of fiduciary duty claim against them. Judge Hilder dismissed McLaughlin's
breach of fiduciary duty claim against Greg Schenk and denied McLaughlin's motion to
o

Even if this were not the case, Judge Hilder's decision concerning the 2009
Ratifications was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice, as it does not
comport with McLaughlin I or the Corporation Act. As discussed above, there is nothing
in the Corporation Act or McLaughlin I suggesting that ratification may only be
attempted once, or that a corporation's disinterested directors or shareholders cannot act
to cure a defect in a previous ratification.
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amend. In McLaughlin I, this Court affirmed both rulings. See 2009 UT 64,ffif15, 39.
Following remand, McLaughlin did not seek leave to assert a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty based on the 2009 Ratifications against Greg Schenk, nor did he seek leave
to add new defendants (e.g., the disinterested director or shareholders who voted in favor
of the 2009 Ratifications) and to assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against them.
Thus McLaughlin simply has no breach of fiduciary duty claim in this litigation.
It is well settled that a plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel
claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment or, for similar reasons, on appeal. See Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,
Tj 31, 48 P.3d 895. A plaintiff can only seek leave to amend by filing a motion in writing
that sets forth the particular grounds and order sought, a memorandum of points and
authorities, and a proposed amended complaint. See id ^ 57-59; see also Coroles v.
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, Iffi 42-45, 79 P.3d 974.

Here, following McLaughlin I,

McLaughlin did not file a motion to amend to assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim (or
any other claim) based on the 2009 Ratifications against any existing or potential
defendant. Thus this Court should not consider such a claim on appeal.
Even if McLaughlin had sought permission to amend his complaint to assert a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty (which he did not), such a claim would have been
futile.

McLaughlin cannot assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against

Greg Schenk based on the 2009 Ratifications, because Greg Schenk did not vote in favor
of the Ratifications. McLaughlin could not assert such a claim against any of the other
directors or shareholders of Cookietree, because they are not parties to this action.
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Finally, McLaughlin could not assert such a claim against Cookietree, as distinct from its
officers and directors, because corporations generally do not owe fiduciary duties to their
shareholders. See, e.g., Small v. Sussman, 713 NJE.2d 1216, 1221 (111. App. Ct. 1999)
("[T]he circuit court also correctly dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim as to [the
corporate defendant] on the independent grounds that a corporation - as distinct from its
officers and directors - does not owe a duty to shareholders. That holding is black letter
law in Illinois/5); Johnston v. Wilbourn, 760 F. Supp. 578, 590 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (federal
common law; "[I]t is well established that a corporation owes no fiduciary duty to its
shareholders, nor can it be held vicariously liable for the alleged breaches of its officers
and directors" (citation omitted)); Onex Food Servs., Inc. v. Grieser, 93 civ. 0218 & 94
civ. 3063, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2797, at *23-34 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1996) (Delaware
law; "corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to its shareholders nor may it be held
vicariously liable for breaches of fiduciary duty committed by its officers"); Burcham v.
Unison Bancorp, Inc., 11 P.3d 130, 146-47 (Kan. 2003) (Kansas law; corporation owes
no fiduciary duty to shareholders).
Even if this Court were somehow to conclude that McLaughlin has a breach of
fiduciary duty claim against the director and shareholders who voted in favor of the 2009
Ratifications (even though they are not parties to this lawsuit), such a claim fails on the
merits. Cookietree's disinterested director and shareholders could not have breached
their fiduciary duties to McLaughlin, as a matter of law, by effectuating ratifications
(after full disclosure of all material facts) that are expressly authorized by McLaughlin I
and Section 851 of the Corporation Act. Rarely, if ever, could it be a breach of fiduciary
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duty on the part of corporate directors or shareholders to take action expressly authorized
by Utah law. And McLaughlin's appeal brief is devoid of any explanation as to how the
2009 Ratifications constituted a breach of fiduciary duty by anyone. McLaughlin merely
states that the 2009 Ratifications "prevented him] from getting his fairness hearing."
(Aplt.'s Brief at 19.) However, the 2009 Ratifications had the same purpose and effect of
a fairness hearing: to resolve the nontransaction conflict of interest that tainted the 2005
Waivers.
Further, Utah's business judgment rule precludes a cause of action for negligence
or breach of fiduciary duty against directors and shareholders for informed decisions
made in good faith. See, e.g., FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leather by Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332,
1334 (Utah 1979) ("If. . . directors, acting in good faith, and with reasonable care, skill,
and diligence, nevertheless fall into a mistake, either of law or fact, they will not be liable
for the consequences of such mistake." (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphases
omitted)).

McLaughlin has failed to establish that the disinterested director and

shareholders who voted in favor of the 2009 Ratifications were not fully informed or did
not act in good faith.
In sum, McLaughlin has not asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on the
2009 Ratifications and, regardless, under the facts of this case, such a claim would fail as
a matter of law.
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IV,

Judge Quinn Correctly Determined That the 2009 Ratifications Comply with
McLaughlin I and the Corporation Act and That, Consequently, Appellees
Are Entitled to Summary Judgment.
McLaughlin argues that Judge Quinn erred in determining that the 2009

Ratifications

comply

reasons: (1) according

with McLaughlin I
to

McLaughlin,

and the Corporation

Greg Schenk

participated

Act for

three

in the

2009

Ratifications, (2) only one director (David Rudd) voted in favor of the 2009 Board
Ratification, and (3) there are material issues of fact concerning the disclosures made to
the disinterested director and shareholders in connection with the 2009 Ratifications that
preclude summary judgment. As explained below, Judge Quinn correctly rejected each
of these arguments.
A,

Greg Schenk Did Not Participate in the 2009 Ratifications.

In arguing that Greg Schenk somehow "participated]" in the 2009 Ratifications
(Aplt.'s Brief at 24), McLaughlin focuses solely on the fact that Greg Schenk voted in
favor of the 2009 Shareholders' Waiver (not the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification).
Greg Schenk did vote in favor of the 2009 Shareholders' Waiver because his vote was
required by the contractual provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement. However,
McLaughlin ignores the fact that, because of Greg Schenk's conflict of interest, the
shareholders were specifically told in the Disclosure Statement that the waiver would
only be approved if (in addition to being approved by two-thirds of all of the issued and
outstanding shares other than the shares at issue in the 1999 Stock Sale) it was also
approved by shareholders owning a majority of the shares that constitute "qualified
shares" under the Corporation Act. As noted above, the 2009 Shareholders' Waiver was,
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in fact, approved by the owners of at least two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding
shares as required by the 1991 Shareholders' Agreements and hy shareholders owning a
majority of the "qualified" or disinterested shares as required by McLaughlin I. These
facts are not disputed by McLaughlin on appeal, and they were not disputed by him in the
trial court.
McLaughlin also ignores another - and more important - undisputed fact: the
2009 Shareholders' Waiver simply was not required to resolve the conflict of interest that
contaminated the 2005 Waivers, only the 2009 Board Ratification or the 2009
Shareholders' Ratification was required, and Greg Schenk did not participate in the 2009
Ratifications. It is undisputed that the 2009 Board Ratification (the action to ratify the
2005 Board Waiver) was undertaken by David Rudd, as the sole disinterested or
"qualified" director. Greg Schenk did not participate in this action. It is also undisputed
that the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification (the action to ratify the 2005 Shareholders'
Waiver) was undertaken by the disinterested or "qualified" shareholders.

987,000

"qualified shares" (shares excluding all those owned by Greg Schenk as required by
McLaughlin I) were voted in favor of the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification and 400,000
"qualified shares" (all owned by McLaughlin and his wife) were voted against. It was
specifically noted at the shareholders' meeting that Greg Schenk did not vote any of his
shares on the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification.9

9

McLaughlin has previously suggested that Greg Schenk should not have even
been present at the shareholders' annual meeting. There is no support for such an
argument under Utah law. The Corporation Act clearly provides that shareholders'
(continued. . .)
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In sum, although McLaughlin correctly notes that this Court stated in
McLaughlin I that the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement "failed . . . to foresee the possible
conflicts presented when a buyer is already a corporate shareholder and votes to waive
the restrictions on share transfers," McLaughlin I, 2009 UT 64, ^38, he is wrong that
"the only way to resolve [this problem] is a . . . fairness hearing" (Aplt.'s Brief at 24).
McLaughlin I clearly states that such a conflict situation can be resolved by "the vote of
disinterested board members or disinterested shareholders to ratify the transaction." 2009
UT 64, Tf 37. Thus, new Board and shareholder waivers were not required in order to
cure the conflict of interest at issue - although both the disinterested director and the
disinterested shareholders executed new waivers here - all that was required was a vote
of the disinterested director or a vote of the disinterested shareholders to ratify the 2005
Waivers. Both votes were undertaken here, and it is undisputed that Greg Schenk did not
participate in either of them, nor was his vote required for such ratifications.
B.

The 2009 Board Ratification Was Approved by the Sole Disinterested
or "Qualified" Director and Is Therefore Valid,

With regard to the 2009 Board Ratification, only the "qualified" or disinterested
director, i.e., David Rudd, acknowledged full disclosure by Greg Schenk of his conflict of
interest and voted to ratify the 2005 Board Waiver. McLaughlin argues that this action is

(. . . continued)
action to ratify a transaction "is not affected by the presence of holders of, or the voting
of, shares that are not qualified shares." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-853(2) (emphases
added). Thus the Corporation Act clearly contemplates that Greg Schenk could attend
the shareholders'meeting.
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i

invalid because Cookietree's bylaws state that "the act of the majority of the directors
present . . . shall . . . be the act of the Board," and that since only David Rudd voted to
ratify the 2005 Board Waiver, there was no majority. (Aplt.'s Brief at 25.) McLaughlin
misunderstands the requirements for directors' action concerning a conflict of interest
situation under Utah law.
The specific requirements for directors' action concerning a conflicted transaction
(or nontransaction, as is the case here) are set forth in Section 852 of the Corporation Act.
This section provides its own requirement for quorums and director action, separate and
distinct from those applying to the standard situation.

Compare Utah Code Ann.

§ 16-10a-824 with § 16-10a-852. Section 852 provides that "a quorum for purposes of
action that complies with this section" is a "majority of the qualified directors on the
board of directors," and that director's action is taken if there is the affirmative vote of
the majority of those qualified directors.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-852(2)-(3).10

Importantly, the Corporation Act "permits a single qualified director to approve another
director's conflicting interest transaction."

Official Commentary to Utah Revised

Business Corporation Act § 852(a) (emphasis added).

*

A "qualified director" is defined as "any director who does not have either a
conflicting interest respecting the transaction, or a familial, financial, professional, or
employment relationship with a second director who does have a conflicting interest
respecting the transaction, which relationship would, in the circumstances, reasonably be
expected to exert an influence on the first director's judgment when voting on the
transaction." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850(3).
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At the time of the 2009 Board actions at issue, there were three members of
Cookietree's

Board:

Greg Schenk, Harold Rosemann,

and

David Rudd.

In

McLaughlin /, this Court held that Greg Schenk had a conflict of interest respecting the
2005 Waivers. Further, as noted above, McLaughlin has argued from the inception of
this litigation that Harold Rosemann has a professional or employment relationship with
Greg Schenk that creates a conflict of interest for him respecting the 2005 Waivers.
Thus, under the circumstances presented here, the only "qualified director" was
David Rudd (who is not, and never has been, employed by Cookietree). McLaughlin has
never argued, and does not argue in this appeal, that David Rudd has a conflict of interest
respecting the 2005 Waivers or the 1999 Stock Sale, nor could he.

Because

David Rudd's affirmative vote on the 2009 Board waiver and Ratification constituted a
majority of the "qualified" directors entitled to vote thereon, the requirement of director
action in a conflicting interest situation was satisfied and the actions were valid under the
framework adopted in McLaughlin I as a matter of law.

McLaughlin made the same argument to this Court in McLaughlin L Having
argued throughout this case that Harold Rosemann has a conflict of interest, McLaughlin
should be estopped from making a different argument now.
Even if Greg Schenk and Harold Rosemann had voted concerning the 2009
Board waiver and Ratification, which is not correct, the framework adopted by this Court
in McLaughlin I requires that the presence and vote (had they voted) of Greg Schenk and
Harold Rosemann simply be ignored. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-852(3) ("Directors'
action that otherwise complies with this section is not affected by the presence or vote of
a director who is not a qualified director." (emphasis added)).

71794486.1 0061604-00002
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While the statutory framework adopted by this Court explicitly provides how to
treat interested directors for quorum and voting purposes (as discussed above),
Cookietree's bylaws are silent on the subject. However, even if the quorum and voting
requirements of the bylaws must be met in addition to the procedures adopted by this
Court for valid Board action respecting a conflict of interest situation, all requirements of
the bylaws were satisfied through ratification in this case.

McLaughlin conveniently

ignores that all three directors voted to ratify the 2009 Board waiver and Ratification
adopted by the sole disinterested director, David Rudd. The vote by David Rudd acting
as the sole disinterested director was necessary to satisfy the procedures adopted in
McLaughlin /, while ratification of that action by all three directors additionally satisfied
the requirement in Cookietree's bylaws (to the extent there is such a requirement in a
conflict of interest situation) for a vote of the majority of directors present.
In sum, the 2009 Board actions of the disinterested director (David Rudd) to waive
the transfer restriction provisions in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement to the 1999 Stock
Sale and to ratify the 2005 Board Waiver, and the entire Board's action to ratify the
disinterested director's waiver and ratification are valid under Utah law. Judge Quinn
correctly determined that these actions satisfied the requirements of McLaughlin /, the
Corporation Act, and Cookietree's bylaws as a matter of law.

13

McLaughlin suggests that the procedures in the bylaws are to be strictly
enforced in order to protect the interests of the shareholders. He fails to explain,
however, how requiring the vote of directors with conflicting interests would be in the
best interest of the shareholders.
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It is important to note that, even if the 2009 Board Ratification were somehow
invalid (which it is not), the 2009 Shareholders' Ratification is independently valid.
C.

Judge Quinn Correctly Determined That There Is No Disputed Issue of
Material Fact Concerning the Disclosures Made in Connection with the
2009 Ratifications-

This is not a case where there is any dispute about the timing or circumstances
surrounding the 2009 Ratifications or the content of disclosures made in connection
therewith. However, McLaughlin attempts to manufacture a triable issue by disputing
two findings made by Judge Quinn. First, McLaughlin disputes Judge Quinn5s finding
that, prior to the 2009 Board meeting, David Rudd "analyzed and reviewed
documentation concerning all of the material facts concerning the [1999] Stock Sale and
the 2005 Waivers." (Aplt.'s Brief at 20.) Second, McLaughlin disputes Judge Quinn's
finding that "the Disclosure Statement sent to the shareholders prior to the post-remand
meeting fully disclosed all material facts." {Id. at 22.)
As is made clear by his own brief, McLaughlin does not actually dispute the above
facts (nor could he); instead, he attempts to present contrary arguments and inferences
about what the facts imply.

Although the Utah Supreme Court has stated that

"reasonable inferences made from . . . undisputed facts can indeed create a genuine issue
of material fact," USA Power, LLCv, PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, f 33, 235 P.3d 749
(emphasis added), it has also made clear that "inferences based on doubtful, vague,
speculative, or inconclusive evidence" are insufficient to defeat summary judgment,
Shaw Res, Ltd, LLC. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C, 2006 UT App 313, f 44, 142
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P.3d 560 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

As explained below, none of

the arguments and inferences put forth by McLaughlin are reasonable and some are
utterly without foundation in fact and are completely fictitious.
1.

All Required Disclosures Were Made to David Rudd Prior to the
2009 Board Actions.

McLaughlin states that he disputes Judge Quimf s finding that, prior to the 2009
Board meeting, David Rudd "analyzed and reviewed documentation concerning all of the
material facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers." (Aplt.'s Brief at
20 (emphasis added).) However, McLaughlin does not actually dispute that David Rudd
analyzed and reviewed such documentation, nor could he.15 Instead, in a desperate
attempt to avoid summary judgment, McLaughlin argues that David Rudd misunderstood
certain facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers. As set forth below,

See also Brigham Truck & Implement Co. v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah
1987) ("[B]are contentions, unsupported by any specifications of facts in support thereof,
raise no material questions of fact").
15

David Rudd's deposition testimony overwhelmingly establishes that prior to
taking the 2009 Board actions at issue, he (1) analyzed and reviewed the 2005 Waivers;
(2) analyzed and reviewed the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement; (3) discussed the proposed
Board action with legal counsel; (4) discussed the proposed Board action with the other
members of the Board; (5) analyzed and reviewed the Disclosure Statement sent to
Cookietree's shareholders concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers (which
contains a complete disclosure of all material facts concerning Greg Schenk's conflict of
interest and the 2005 Waivers); (6) analyzed and reviewed Cookietree's financial
statements and other financial information; and (7) analyzed and reviewed the Court's
McLaughlin I decision. (See R3385-86.) McLaughlin does not dispute the fact that
David Rudd took these actions, and the documentation reviewed by him contains all of
the material facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers.
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McLaughlin's arguments are not supported by the record and are based on blatant
mischaracterizations of David Rudd's deposition testimony.
McLaughlin first argues that David Rudd does "not know what consideration was
paid for the disputed shares in 1999." {Id. at 21.)

This is incorrect.

During his

deposition, David Rudd stated that he could not remember what consideration was paid
for the shares in 1999, but that prior to taking the 2009 Board actions, he reviewed
several documents, including the Disclosure Statement, and that he was familiar with the
information contained therein at the time of the Board actions at issue. (R3387.) The
Disclosure Statement clearly states that Anna Schenk sold the shares at issue to
Greg Schenk for "$272,600 pursuant to a Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement." {Id.)
The fact that David Rudd did not remember the exact amount paid for the shares at the
time of his deposition is completely immaterial.
McLaughlin next argues that David Rudd does not know "how many shares . . .
McLaughlin (and, by extension, other shareholders) would have been able to acquire in
1999[] had they been given the opportunity . . . ." (Aplt.'s Brief at 21.) This is because
the number of shares McLaughlin and other shareholders could theoretically have
purchased is unknown. If the 545,200 shares had not been sold to Greg Schenk, they
presumably would have continued to be held by Anna Schenk, and McLaughlin would
not have had the opportunity to purchase any shares. {See R3387 (Rudd Dep. at 29
("A: I think to say that the shareholders, you know, would have bought those shares also
takes a leap, because [Anna Schenk] may well have kept them.")).) Alternatively, if
Anna Schenk had first offered the shares to Cookietree, Cookietree may have purchased

71794486.10061604-00002
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all of them. McLaughlin simply ignores that if the transfer restriction provisions in the
1991 Shareholders' Agreement had been followed in 1999, he may not have had the
opportunity to purchase any shares.16 David Rudd clearly understood, however, that, if
the shares had not been sold to Greg Schenk, one possible outcome would have been that
McLaughlin and other shareholders could have purchased additional shares. David Rudd
stated that he carefully considered "what potential dividends may have been paid to other
shareholders, 1999 through 2010, had other shareholders purchased portions of the
545,200 shares." (R2362 (Rudd Dep. at 25-26).) McLaughlin conveniently ignores this
aspect of David Rudd's testimony.
McLaughlin next argues that David Rudd "only knows one perspective (the one
controlled by Greg Schenk and his lawyers)," because he never "talked to Anna Schenk"
or to "Sam McLaughlin."

(Aplt.'s Brief at 21.)

There is no requirement in the

Corporation Act that David Rudd speak to Anna Schenk or McLaughlin. Prior to taking
the Board actions at issue, David Rudd reviewed the 2005 Waivers; he reviewed the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement; he discussed the proposed Board action with the other

Anna Schenk had no obligation to sell her shares. If she had offered the shares
to Cookietree, Cookietree could have bought them all, in which case there would have
been no opportunity for McLaughlin to purchase additional shares. If Cookietree had
declined its option to purchase some or all of the shares, there is simply no evidence in
this case suggesting that McLaughlin would or could have purchased any of the shares.
Finally, even if McLaughlin had been presented with the opportunity to purchase shares
and had the financial means to take advantage of the opportunity, the number of shares he
would have purchased is unknown and would have depended on a number of unknowable
factors, including whether other shareholders had exercised their rights to purchase shares
and how many.
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members of the Board; he reviewed the Disclosure Statement; and he reviewed the
McLaughlin I decision. This documentation fully disclosed all material facts concerning
the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers. It strains credulity beyond the breaking point
for McLaughlin to argue that the McLaughlin I decision did not set forth his
"perspective" regarding the 1999 Stock Sale. (See R3388 (Rudd Dep. at 28 (UQ: Let me
ask you this. Did you or have you considered factors that would indicate it's not fair to
the company or the shareholders? A: Well, of course . . . as part of. . . my review of the
materials and the Supreme Court opinion and the disclosure document . . . yes, I did
consider it.")).)
McLaughlin next argues that David Rudd "incorrectly believes that, in 1999,
Anna Schenk offered the 545,200 shares . . . to Cookietree" before offering them to
Greg Schenk. (Aplt.'s Brief at 20.) This is utterly false. David Rudd testified that the
shares were not offered to Cookietree in 1999, or at any time. (See R3388 (Rudd Dep. at
45 ("A: . . . I was confused when you were asking the question about the process that
occurred in 1999 as to whether the shares were offered to the company and the
shareholders. . . .

[T]he shares were not offered to the company or to the

shareholders."))); see also R3389 (Rudd Dep. at 50 ("Q: And so you understand - well,
do you understand that the shareholder agreement was not complied with in 1999 when
the shares were transferred from Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk? A: Yeah, otherwise,
there wouldn't be a waiver agreements

(emphases added))).)

Giving counsel for

McLaughlin every benefit of the doubt, it appears the foregoing argument was made
without carefully reviewing the entirety of David Rudd's testimony (although counsel for
71794486.10061604-00002

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
3 7 may contain errors.

McLaughlin made the same erroneous argument to the trial court), not with the intent to
deceive this Court. Either way, McLaughlin's statement that David Rudd believed that
the transfer restriction provisions were followed in 1999 is utterly false.
McLaughlin next argues that David Rudd believes that one of the factors bearing
on whether the 1999 Stock Sale was fair to the shareholders is "the contribution of people
who run the business . . . [and] add certain benefits to the business," but that David Rudd
does not have any understanding "as to whether McLaughlin was such an employee."
(Aplt.'s Brief at 22.) David Rudd simply did not testify that one of the factors bearing on
whether the 1999 Stock Sale was fair to the shareholders is the contribution of people
who run the business. McLaughlin's suggestion to the contrary is based on a complete
mischaracterization of David Rudd's deposition testimony. Further, McLaughlin's job
performance while he was employed by Cookietree is entirely immaterial, because at the
time David Rudd effectuated the 2009 Board waiver and Ratification, McLaughlin was
not employed by Cookietree.

Further, whether the 2005 Waivers were fair to

McLaughlin individually is simply not relevant.
McLaughlin next argues that David Rudd "stated that notice [to the other
shareholders] should have been given" in 1999.
misconstrues David Rudd's testimony.

{Id. at 22.)

McLaughlin, again,

Although David Rudd stated that the 1991

Shareholders' Agreement contains a notice provision, he also stated that any of its
provisions (including the notice provision) can be waived as provided in paragraph 11.
{See R3390 (Rudd Dep. at 90 ("Q: And do you have an understanding of the effect of
paragraph 11 on the shareholder agreement and whether parties to the contract could rely
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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on paragraph 11? A: Yes, they could rely on paragraph 11 just as much as any other
paragraph in the agreement.")).) All of the shareholders (including McLaughlin and his
wife) were given notice of the proposed 2009 Shareholders' Waiver.

Indeed,

McLaughlin's counsel, as proxy for McLaughlin, attended the 2009 shareholders'
meeting on behalf of McLaughlin and voiced their disapproval of and voted against the
proposed shareholder actions.

Clearly, the other shareholders did not agree with

McLaughlin.
Finally, McLaughlin argues that David Rudd testified that "parties to a contract. .
. have the right to expect that the contract's provisions are followed," but he voted in
favor of the 2009 Board waiver. (Aplt.'s Brief at 22.) David Rudd did testify: "I think
people who sign contracts can fairly expect that they'll be followed." (R3391 (Rudd
Dep. 80-81).) However, David Rudd also testified that, in 2005, Cookietree's Board and
shareholders "could rely on Paragraph 11 [of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement] just as
much as any other paragraph of the agreement. Paragraph 11 deals with a waiver of the
sale restrictions by an authorized action by the board or by the shareholders holding at
least two-thirds of the shares." (Id. (Rudd Dep. at 90).)
In sum, McLaughlin does not dispute the fact that David Rudd was aware of all
material facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers before he
effectuated the 2009 Board Ratification, in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-850(4)(a)-(b). McLaughlin's argument that David Rudd misunderstood certain
facts concerning the 1999 Stock Sale and the 2005 Waivers is, for the reasons set forth
above, utterly without merit.

71794486.10061604-00002
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2.

All Required Disclosures Were Made to the Shareholders Prior
to the 2009 Shareholder Actions.

McLaughlin concedes, as he must, that the Disclosure Statement contained all
facts concerning the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, the transfer restriction provisions
contained therein, the 1999 Stock Sale, the 2005 Waivers, Greg Schenk's conflict of
interest and the circumstances surrounding this litigation, and the McLaughlin I decision.
McLaughlin also concedes that a copy of the McLaughlin I decision was enclosed with
the Disclosure Statement. (Aplt.'s Brief at 22.)
However, McLaughlin argues, in scattershot fashion, that the Disclosure Statement
(1) did not contain a "counter opinion," (2) was drafted by litigation counsel, (3) was
confusing to read, (4) did not disclose whether Greg Schenk paid consideration for the
2005 Waivers, and (5) did not disclose whether Harold Rosemann received consideration
for the 2005 Waivers. For the following reasons, Judge Quinn correctly determined that
none of these arguments created a disputed issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment.
First, McLaughlin's argument that the Disclosure Statement does not contain a
"counter opinion" is wrong.

The Disclosure Statement enclosed a copy of the

McLaughlin I decision, which clearly sets forth McLaughlin's position regarding the
2005 Waivers, the 1999 Stock Sale, and the duty of good faith owed by shareholders in
close corporations. Moreover, although McLaughlin conveniently ignores this fact, his
own counsel (the same counsel representing him in this appeal) attended the 2009
shareholders' meeting in person and voiced their disapproval of and voted against the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proposed shareholder actions.

Clearly, the other shareholders did not agree with

McLaughlin or his counsel.
Second, whether the Disclosure Statement was drafted by Cookietree's counsel is
simply irrelevant. The fact that counsel drafted the Disclosure Statement does not mean
that anything contained therein is inaccurate, and, tellingly, McLaughlin fails to argue
that anything contained therein is inaccurate. The trial court correctly refused to assume
the existence of inaccuracies simply because counsel drafted the document.
Third, McLaughlin's argument that the Disclosure Statement is "confusing to
read" is merely his opinion (albeit an erroneous one) and does not create a triable issue of
fact.
Fourth, McLaughlin's suggestion that Greg Schenk paid and Harold Rosemann
received consideration for the 2005 Waivers has no foundation in fact and is completely
fictional.

Greg Schenk clearly testified that he did not pay any consideration to

Harold Rosemann (or anyone else) for the 2005 Waivers.

(R3335-36.)

Likewise,

Harold Rosemann clearly testified that he did not receive any consideration from
Greg Schenk (or anyone else) in exchange for his votes in favor of the 2005 Waivers.
(R3336.) Thus the Disclosure Statement did not address the issue of the consideration
paid for the 2005 Waivers, because there was no such consideration paid. McLaughlin
has simply manufactured this issue out of thin air, without even the proverbial shred of
evidence to support it.
In sum, McLaughlin has failed to manufacture a disputed issue of material fact
concerning the disclosures made in connection with the 2009 Ratifications.

71794486.10061604-00002
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The

shareholders

were

fully

informed

in

accordance

with

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 16-10a-850(4)(a)-(b). Thus Judge Quinn correctly entered summary judgment in favor
of Appellees.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Judge Quinn properly complied, on remand, with
this Court's decision in McLaughlin I in ruling that he could consider options other than a
fairness hearing - namely, the 2009 Ratifications - for resolving the nontransaction
conflict of interest situation at issue. Judge Quinn also correctly determined that the 2009
Ratifications complied with the framework set forth in McLaughlin I and the Corporation
Act, and that there are no disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Thus, Judge Quinn's order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees should be
affirmed and this case should be closed.
DATED this 17th day of August, 2012.

STOEL RIVES LLP

l^M^t

Matthew M. Dur%m (#6214)
Justin B. Palmer (#8937)
Attorneys for Appellees Greg Schenk and
Cookietree, Inc.
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ADDENDUM
1.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-850, -851, -852, -853 (2012).

2.

McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, 220 P.3d 146

3.

Minutes of December 18, 2009 Board Meeting

4.

Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders, Disclosure Statement, and
Proxy for Annual Meeting of Shareholders

5.

Minutes of 2009 Annual Shareholders Meeting

6.

Certificate and Report of Inspector of Election/Voting Judge
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Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-850

(2012)

§ 16-10a-850. Definitions relating to conflicting interest transactions

As used in Sections 16-10a-850 through 16-10a-853:
(1) "Conflicting interest" with respect to a corporation means the interest a director has
respecting a transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the corporation or by any entity
in which the corporation has a controlling interest if:
(a) whether or not the transaction is brought before the board of directors of the
corporation for action, the director knows at the time of commitment that the director or a
related person of the director is a party to the transaction or has a beneficial financial interest in
or is so closely linked to, the transaction and the transaction is so financially significant to the
director or a related person of the director that the interest would reasonably be expected to
exert an influence on the director's judgment if the director were called upon to vote on the
transaction; or
(b) the transaction is brought, or is of a character and significance to the corporation that it
would in the normal course be brought, before the board of directors for action, and the director
knows at the time of commitment that any of the following persons is either a party to the
transaction or has a beneficial financial interest in, or is so closely linked to, the transaction and
the transaction is so financially significant to the person that the interest would reasonably be
expected to exert an influence on the director's judgment if the director were called upon to
vote on the transaction:
(i) an entity, other than the corporation, of which the director is a director, general
partner, agent, or employee or an entity to which the director owes a fiduciary duty, other than
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<
a fiduciary duty arising because the director is a director of the corporation;
(ii) an individual who is a general partner, principal, or employer of the director or who is
a beneficiary of a fiduciary duty owed by the director, other than a fiduciary duty arising
because the director is a director of the corporation; or

,

(iii) a person that controls one or more of the entities specified in Subsection (l)(b)(i) or
an entity that is controlled by, or is under common control with, one or more of the entities or
individuals specified in Subsection (l)(b)(i) or (l)(b)(ii).
(2) "Director's conflicting interest transaction" with respect to a corporation means a
transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the corporation, or by any entity controlled by
the corporation respecting which a director has a conflicting interest.

.

(3) "Qualified director" means, with respect to a director's conflicting interest transaction, any
director who does not have either a conflicting interest respecting the transaction, or a familial,
financial, professional, or employment relationship with a second director who does have a
conflicting interest respecting the transaction, which relationship would, in the circumstances,
reasonably be expected to exert an influence on the first director's judgment when voting on the
transaction.
(4) "Required disclosure" means disclosure by the director who has a conflicting interest of:
(a) the existence and nature of the conflicting interest; and

'

(b) all facts known to the director respecting the subject matter of the transaction that an
ordinarily prudent person would reasonably believe to be material to a judgment about whether
or not to proceed with the transaction.
(5) "Time of commitment" respecting a transaction means the time when the transaction is
consummated or, if made pursuant to contract, the time when the corporation or the entity
controlled by the corporation becomes contractually obligated so that its unilateral withdrawal
from the transaction would entail significant loss, liability, or other damage.

<
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(1) A transaction effected or proposed to be effected by a corporation or by any entity
controlled by the corporation that is not a director's conflicting interest transaction may not be
enjoined, be set aside, or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions, in a proceeding
by a shareholder or by or in the right of the corporation, solely because a director, or any
person with whom or which the director has a personal, economic, or other association, has an
interest in the transaction.
(2) A director's conflicting interest transaction may not be enjoined, be set aside, or give rise to
an award of damages or other sanctions, in a proceeding by a shareholder or by or in the right
of the corporation, solely because the director, or any person with whom or which the director
has a personal, economic, or other association, has an interest in the transaction, if:
(a) directors' action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in compliance with
Section 16-10a-852;
(b) shareholders' action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in compliance with
Section 16-10a-853; or
(c) the transaction, judged according to the circumstances at the time of commitment, is
established to have been fair to the corporation.
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(1) Directors' action respecting a transaction is taken for purposes of Subsection 16-10a-851
(2)(a) if the transaction received the affirmative vote of a majority of those qualified directors
on the board of directors or on a duly empowered committee of the board who voted on the
transaction after either required disclosure to them, to the extent the information was not
known by them, or compliance with Subsection (2), provided that action by a committee is
effective under this subsection only if:
(a) all its members are qualified directors; and
(b) its members are either ail of the qualified directors or are appointed by the affirmative
vote of a majority of the qualified directors.
(2) If a director has a conflicting interest respecting a transaction, but neither the director nor a
related person of the director is a party to the transaction, and if the director has a duty under
law or professional canon, or a duty of confidentiality to another person, respecting information
relating to the transaction so that the director may not make the disclosure described in Section
16-10a-S50(4)(b), then disclosure is sufficient for purposes of Subsection (1) if the director
discloses to the directors voting on the transaction, before their vote, the existence and nature
of the conflicting interest and informs them of the character and limitations imposed by that
duty.
(3) A majority of the qualified directors on the board of directors or on the committee, as the
case may be, constitutes a quorum for purposes of action that complies with this section.
Directors' action that otherwise complies with this section is not affected by the presence or
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vote of a director who is not a qualified director.
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(1) Shareholders' action respecting a transaction is effective for purposes of Subsection 1610a-851(2)(b) if a quorum existed pursuant to Subsection (2) and a majority of the votes
entitled to be cast by holders of qualified shares present in person or by proxy at the meeting
were cast in favor of the transaction after notice to shareholders describing the director's
conflicting interest transaction, provision of the information referred to in Subsection (3), and
required disclosure to the shareholders who voted on the transaction, to the extent the
information was not known by them.
(2) A majority of the votes entitled to be cast by the holders of all qualified shares constitutes a
quorum for purposes of action that complies with this section. Subject to the provisions of
Subsections (3) and (4), shareholders' action that otherwise complies with this section is not
affected by the presence of holders of, or the voting of, shares that are not qualified shares.
(3) For purposes of compliance with Subsection (1), a director who has a conflicting interest
respecting the transaction shall, before the shareholders vote, inform the secretary or other
officer or agent of the corporation authorized to tabulate votes of the number and the identity of
persons holding or controlling the vote, of all shares that the director knows are beneficially
owned, or the voting of which is controlled, by the director or by a related person of the
director, or both.
(4) If a shareholders' vote does not comply with Subsection (1) solely because of a failure of a
director to comply with Subsection (3), and if the director establishes that the failure did not
determine and was not intended by him to influence the outcome of the vote, the court may,
with or without further proceedings under Subsection 16-10a-851(2)(c), take any action
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respecting the transaction and the director, and give any effect to the shareholders' vote, as it
considers appropriate in the circumstances.
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October 2, 2009, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Released for Publication December 3, 2009.
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1]
Third District, Salt Lake. The Honorable Robert K. Hilder. No. 040924997.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant minority shareholder (and employee) brought breach of
contract and fiduciary duty claims against appellants, the company (a closely held corporation)
and its president, as well as a derivative action. Some of the contractual claims were
arbitrated in the shareholder's favor. The Third District Court, Salt Lake, Utah, granted the
company's motion to dismiss the rest of the shareholder's claims on summary judgment, and
he appealed.
OVERVIEW: On review, the shareholder raised several issues contending the district court
erred in rendering the summary judgment. The supreme court held that the president, as a
close corporation shareholder, owed the minority shareholder individually a duty to act in the
utmost good faith, but that he did not violate this duty because his actions did not thwart the
minority shareholder's reasonable expectations; the minority shareholder was not a founding
member who created the company with the expectation of employment, and while it was likely
that his initial stock purchase allowance and the later stock purchase agreement were offered
as an incentive or reward for his work performance, the purchase allowances were not
inextricably tied to his employment, but a separate investment in the company. Additionally,
waivers executed by the board and the shareholders of the corporation were contaminated by
a conflict of interest, and the case needed to be remanded for a determination of whether the
waivers were fair. Finally, the supreme court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the minority shareholder's motion to amend as it would have been futile.
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OUTCOME: The cause was remanded for a determination of whether the waivers ratifying a
share transfer were fair; otherwise, the judgment was affirmed.

CORE TERMS: shareholder, fiduciary duty, stock, conflict of interest, good faith, termination,
fiduciary, duty owed, stockholder, oppression, publicly, utmost, reasonable expectations,
partnership, partner's, salary, amend, majority shareholder, bylaws, owe, matter of law,
minority shareholder, summary judgment, selling, futile, dissolution, breached, waiving, case
law, common law
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amend its complaint for abuse of discretion. However, this discretion is not
unlimited.
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±ln Utah, courts consider a closely held corporation to be a company in which there is
(1) a small number of shareholders; (2) no ready market for corporate stock; and (3)
active shareholder participation in the business. More Like This Headnote |
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^ $ i Directors and officers are required to carry out their corporate duties in good faith,
with prudent care, and in the best interest of the corporation. Utah Code Ann. § 1610a-840 (2005). These corporate duties are interpreted to coincide with the common
law understanding that officers and directors owe these duties to the corporation and
shareholders collectively, not individually. Actions for breach of a fiduciary duty
generally belong to the corporation. More Like This Headnote |
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±ln contrast to the general standard for corporate duties, the statutory partnership
standard of care is interpreted to require the utmost good faith between individual
partners. Normally, partners occupy a fiduciary relationship and must deal with each
other in the utmost good faith. Partners stand in a fiduciary relation to each other,
and that is the duty of each partner to observe the utmost good faith towards his
copartners in all dealings and transactions that come within the scope of the
partnership business. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18 (2007). More Like This Headnote |
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£,Shareho\ders in closely held corporations owe their co-shareholders fiduciary
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± Breaches of the fiduciary duty owed by close corporation shareholders arise in
several circumstances, the facts of which commonly overlap. These circumstances
may be unequal treatment, frustration of reasonable expectations of involvement,
and a freezeout or squeezeout. In all cases there is a common element, a
shareholder's investment expectation in a close corporation is frustrated by another
shareholder's actions.
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±\Nhen minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit alleging a breach of the
strict good faith duty, courts must carefully analyze the action taken by the
controlling stockholders in the individual case and ask whether the controlling group
can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action. Under this standard for
fiduciary duty protection, the termination of an employee is not always a breach of
fiduciary duty.
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Q

HN14

±,Not every discharge of an at-will employee of a close corporation who happens to
own stock in the corporation gives rise to a successful breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Instead, the court must consider the formal policies and practices of the close
corporation, and how these policies and practices are interpreted by and impact all
shareholders to determine whether or not a shareholder's reasonable expectations
were thwarted. When considering an allegation of oppressive conduct, a court
should review what the majority shareholders knew, or should have known, to be
the petitioner's expectations in entering the particular enterprise. Majority conduct
should not be deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner's subjective hopes
and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled. Disappointment alone should not
necessarily be equated with oppression. This close consideration of shareholders'
expectations is necessary to ensure that corporations are not crippled and kept from
efficiently operating their business; it is well accepted that corporate officers must
have a large measure of discretion in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding
whether to merge or consolidate, establishing the salaries of corporate officers,
dismissing directors with or without cause, and hiring and firing corporate
employees.
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H/vis^r Many situations arise in which a director's or shareholder's personal economic
interest is or may be adverse to the economic interest of the corporation, but which
do not entail a "transaction" by or with the corporation. These situations are no less
concerning because on the surface they appear to suffer from the same lack of
probity and fair dealing as statutory conflict of interest transactions. The law does
not ignore such troubling circumstances, but instead leaves the treatment of such
situations for development under the common law. Procedures designed to deal with
statutory conflicts of interest provide a useful strategy for dealing with such
situations as a matter of common law. More Like This Headnote
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±When
considering a motion to amend, the district court should primarily consider
whether the motion would cause unavoidable prejudice to the opposing party. In
addition, the district court may also consider delay, bad faith, or futility of the
amendment. A party cannot obtain a different outcome by adding to the parties or
rephrasing claims. More Like This Headnote
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Justin B. Palmer^, George M. Haley v # , Richard D. Flint • * £ , Salt Lake

JUDGES: DURHAM • , Chief Justice. Associate Chief Justice Durrant^, Justice Wilkins, Justice
Parrish ^, and District Judge Hadfield ^ concur in Chief Justice Durham Vs opinion. Justice
Nehring ^r does not participate herein; District Judge Ben H. Hadfield • sat.
OPINION BY: DURHAM ^
OPINION

[**150] DURHAM ^ Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
[*P1] HNlmfiri a public corporation, directors and officers owe the corporation and the
shareholders collectively a duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation.
HN2r

+ln a partnership, each partner owes each of the other partners individually a duty to act
with the utmost good faith. The appellant in this case, Samuel R. McLaughlin, a minority
shareholder in a closely held corporation, asks this court to impose on shareholders in such
corporations a duty to individual shareholders similar to the duty owed in a partnership.
McLaughlin also asks us to reverse the district court's holding that waivers of a provision of this
closely held corporation's shareholder [***2] agreement were valid, and reverse its order
denying amendments to McLaughlin's complaint. We hold that the appellee Greg Schenck, as a
close corporation shareholder, owed McLaughlin individually a duty to act in the utmost good
faith, but that he did not violate this duty because his actions did not thwart McLaughlin's
reasonable expectations. Additionally, we hold that waivers executed by the board and the
shareholders of the corporation were contaminated by a conflict of interest, and we therefore
remand for a determination of whether the waivers were fair. Finally, we hold that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying McLaughlin's motion to amend by finding that the
amendment would be futile.
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BACKGROUND
[*P2] ^ ^ B e c a u s e the trial court dismissed this case on summary judgment, "we review the
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party," in this case, McLaughlin. GLFP, Ltd. v. CL Mgmt, Ltd,, 2007 UT App 131, P 5, 163 P.3d
636.
[*P3] Cookietree, Inc. is a privately held Utah corporation that produces and retails baked
goods. The company was formed in 1981, with Greg Schenck and his father, Boyd Schenck,
among the original [***3] shareholders. Greg Schenck was named president at the
corporation's founding. He currently holds the same position. In 1992, Greg Schenck recruited
Sam McLaughlin to work as the operations leader for Cookietree. McLaughlin's previous
experience at Pillsbury and Quaker Oats made him a valuable employee, and he was quickly
promoted to vice president of operations and then chief operating officer and vice president of
operations. As he invested more of his career in Cookietree, McLaughlin also invested his
personal finances in the corporation by slowly purchasing increasing amounts of shares in the
corporation.
[*P4] As part of his agreement to join Cookietree as an employee, McLaughlin and the
company agreed to certain terms, which were memorialized in an employment agreement. This
agreement guaranteed McLaughlin a minimum salary that was supplemented with a bonus
formula. It also provided him with the option of acquiring up to 200,000 shares of common stock
in the company. Importantly, under the agreement, McLaughlin was an at-will employee. Thus,
either party could terminate the employment relationship at any time so long as six-months
notice was given.
[**151] [*P5] In 1993, Cookietree and McLaughlin [***4] entered into an Incentive Stock
Option Agreement that allowed McLaughlin to purchase an additional 200,000 shares of the
company's common stock. This agreement also required McLaughlin to agree to a 1991
Shareholder Agreement. The 1991 Shareholder Agreement limited the ability of shareholders to
sell, assign, or pledge their common stock. Under the agreement, selling shareholders had to first
offer their shares, by written notice, to the corporation. If Cookietree did not elect to purchase
any or all of the shares, the secretary of Cookietree was required to provide written notice to all
shareholders identifying the number of shares available for purchase. Each shareholder was then
entitled to purchase a portion of the shares equal to his or her ownership percentage of the
outstanding common stock. If, at the close of the applicable option periods, not all available
shares had been purchased, the selling shareholder could then sell the shares elsewhere. The
agreement also provided that written consent from either the board of directors or the owners of
at least two-thirds of the shares (excluding the shares owned by the selling shareholder) could
waive the agreement's restrictions [***5] on share transfers. The 1991 Shareholder Agreement
was replaced in 1999 with a new shareholder agreement, which contained the same terms.
[*P6] In 1998, the majority shareholder of Cookietree, Boyd Schenck, passed away. Just
before his death he transferred 818,000 shares to Greg Schenck. x Following this transfer Greg
Schenck owned around 49 percent of Cookietree, with Boyd Schenck retaining around ten
percent (545,200) of the company's shares. After Boyd's death, Boyd's wife, Anna, 2 sold Greg
Schenck 545,200 shares, making Greg Schenck the majority shareholder, with about sixty-five
percent of the company's stock. This transfer was not recorded in Cookietree's minutes or written
records, and a right of first refusal was not provided to the corporation or the other shareholders.
Stock certificates were nonetheless issued. At the time this transfer was made, it violated the
1991 Shareholder Agreement.
FOOTNOTES
I This transaction was not subject to the right of refusal provisions of the shareholder
agreement because it was a transfer between immediate family members, which was allowed
under the 1991 Shareholder Agreement.
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2 The parties disagree on whether Boyd's estate or Anna transferred the shares to
[***6] Greg Schenck. The district court indicated in its order that Anna transferred the
shares to Greg Schenck. We rely on this implicit factual finding.

[*P7] In 2003, Greg Schenck indicated that he was interested in selling Cookietree. McLaughlin
wanted to purchase the company and sent a letter of intent, which conveyed this interest to
Cookietree and its president, Greg Schenck. McLaughlin, however, was never able to raise the full
amount of the purchase price. During this period, Greg Schenck began discussions with another
cookie company, Otis Spunkmeyer, which was interested as a strategic buyer in purchasing
Cookietree.
[*P8] At this point, the relationship between McLaughlin and Greg Schenck, which previously
had been not only professional but also personal and social, began to deteriorate. McLaughlin
would not agree to various terms of the Otis Spunkmeyer transaction, including consent to a
noncompete agreement. About this same time, McLaughlin learned of the prior stock transfer
between Anna Schenck and Greg Schenck. During the discussions with Otis Spunkmeyer,
McLaughlin insisted on his right of first refusal for any sold and transferred stock. McLaughlin was
thereafter excluded from executive [***7] meetings. McLaughlin alleges that after he asserted
his right to a bonus on the asset sale of Cookietree to Otis Spunkmeyer, Greg Schenck and Otis
Spunkmeyer officers negotiated to instead structure the sale as a stock sale. McLaughlin
continued to demand his right of first refusal and requested documentation regarding Anna
Schenck's stock sale to Greg Schenck.
[*P9] On August 4, 2004, Harold Rosemann, board member and chief financial officer for
Cookietree, instructed Kim McLaughlin, McLaughlin's wife and also an employee of Cookietree, to
tell McLaughlin to withdraw his claims or "there's going to be some organizational changes around
here." On August [**152] 17, 2004, as a shareholder, McLaughlin made an additional request
for information regarding the Schenck stock transaction. That same day Greg Schenck confronted
McLaughlin and fired him. His notice of termination indicated that it was without cause. Pursuant
to McLaughlin's employment agreement, the termination date was not effective for six months.
Thus, McLaughlin continued to receive his salary and bonuses for six months, although this
compensation was paid at his original contract rate rather than his current salary and bonus rate.
McLaughlin [***8] was immediately relieved of all duties, blocked from company email, and
excluded from the corporate premises. When McLaughlin refused to leave, police escorted him
from the property. After McLaughlin's termination, Cookietree contacted McLaughlin's lawyer and
indicated that "everything [was] negotiable; [they] were looking for a global resolution."
Following his termination McLaughlin continued to receive dividends from his Cookietree holdings.
This income, along with his wife's stock dividends, comprised half of their family's income. Kim
McLaughlin continued to work at Cookietree for some time after McLaughlin's termination.
[*P10] In November 2004, McLaughlin sued Cookietree and Greg Schenck for breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty based on Greg Schenck's stock acquisition. In March 2005,
Mclaughlin filed another suit against Cookietree and Greg Schenck for breach of contract and
breach of fiduciary duty based on McLaughlin's termination. McLaughlin also filed a derivative
action. All three cases were then consolidated in the district court. The district court referred
McLaughlin's claims relating to his employment contract to arbitration. McLaughlin was awarded
damages for [***9] Cookietree's breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing for
paying the 1992 contract salary rate for McLaughlin's severance pay rather than his most recent
salary and bonus rate. The arbitrator dismissed all other contract claims and deferred to the
district court to resolve the breach of fiduciary duty claim relating to the termination.
[*P11] In May 2005 during an unnoticed meeting, Cookietree's board of directors—Greg
Schenck; his wife, Gayle Schenck; and Harold Rosemann-ratified the 1999 stock transaction by
waiving the corporation's right of refusal. Around the same time, Greg Schenck contacted Jerry
Smekal, a Cookietree shareholder, and requested that he also sign a consent and waiver ratifying
the 1999 transaction. Smekal, who held 529,000 shares, agreed to sign the form. Additionally,
Greg Schenck and Harold Rosemann also signed the shareholder consent and waiver forms,
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representing 2,181,200 and 316,000 respectively, or nearly ninety percent, of Cookietree's
shares.
[*P12] Cookietree moved to dismiss McLaughlin's claims on summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion and dismissed all pending claims, finding that Greg Schenck did not
owe any fiduciary duty to [***10] McLaughlin with respect to the "dealings related to
McLaughlin in his role as an employee" and that Cookietree, not Greg Schenck, terminated
McLaughlin from his employment. Additionally, with respect to the stock transaction, the district
court found that "all of the actions taken by both Cookietree and Mr. Schenck were within the
terms of the [1991 shareholder] agreement and, to the extent certain corporate actions were not
undertaken at the time of the sale, the 2005 waiver and ratification actions were effective as a
matter of law." With these findings, the district court held that it was "unable to identify any
factual claim . . . that would give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty," and thus dismissed
all claims, but left McLaughlin with the option to "come forward with facts and evidence that
would support a breach of fiduciary duty claim that has not already been addressed." Shortly
thereafter, McLaughlin moved for permission to amend his complaint by adding Gayle Schenck
and Harold Rosemann as additional parties. The basis for his breach of fiduciary duty claims
largely remained the same. The district court denied this motion holding that an amendment
would be futile [ * * * n ] because McLaughlin failed to identify any evidence that was not
addressed by the summary judgment. McLaughlin appealed the district court's final order. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2008).
[**153] ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P13] McLaughlin asks this court to review the district court's grant of summary judgment to
the defendants on three grounds. First, McLaughlin asks the court to determine whether
Cookietree shareholders owed McLaughlin fiduciary duties individually, and if so whether any
such duty was violated. Second, McLaughlin requests that we review whether the board's and
shareholders' 2005 ratifications were "valid and effective." Finally, McLaughlin argues the district
court abused its discretion in denying McLaughlin's motion to amend his complaint.
[*P14] w/V4 "?Summary judgment "is appropriate only in the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." S. Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference Ctr.r 2008 UT 88, P 12, 200 P.3d 643.
Accordingly, when "reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we review the facts
and all reasonable inferences in the light [***12] most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id.
As to the underlying determinations, W W 5 ? w e review legal questions, such as the scope of a
shareholder's fiduciary duty and the validity of share transfers under the shareholder agreement,
for correctness. HN6lh\Ne review a district court's decision to deny a plaintiff's motion to amend
its complaint for abuse of discretion. See Swan Creek Vill. Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne, 2006 UT
22, P15, 134 P.3d 1122. We note, however, that this discretion is not unlimited. Aurora Credit
Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1281-82 (Utah 1998).
ANALYSIS
I. SHAREHOLDERS IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS OWE EACH OTHER ENHANCED FIDUCIARY
DUTIES, BUT SCHENCK DID NOT VIOLATE ANY DUTY OWED TO MCLAUGHLIN
[*P15] This case presents the question of whether shareholders of closely held corporations 3—
also commonly known as close corporations—should be treated differently than shareholders of
publicly traded corporations when applying the provisions of the Utah Revised Business
Corporation Act (the Corporation Act), Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-101 to -1705 (2005 & Supp.
2008), and the accompanying interpretive and common law case law. We previously
acknowledged that in close [***13] corporations it is "unlikely that there is a disinterested
board," Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah 1998),
and that such corporations are more vulnerable to malfeasance because of the overlapping
identity of board members and majority shareholders. Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT
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40, P 21, 216 P.3d 944. For these reasons, W / V 7 ? w e have treated close corporations differently
by allowing shareholders in these corporations to proceed as a class of one in derivative actions.
Id. P 22. We also have allowed close corporation shareholders to proceed both derivatively and
directly against corporate officers for breaches of duties owed to the corporation and to minority
shareholders. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc., 970 P.2d at 1280-81. In this case we now consider
whether the duties owed by shareholders differ in closely held corporations and publicly traded
corporations, and if so, whether these duties were breached on those facts.
FOOTNOTES
3 HN8w+in Utah, we consider a closely held corporation to be a company in which there is "'(1)
a small number of shareholders; (2) no ready market for corporate stock; and (3) active
shareholder participation in the business.'" [***14] Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009
UT 40, P 21 216 P.3d 944 (quoting Dansie v. City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, P 17, 134 P.3d
1139).

A. The Fiduciary Duty of Shareholders in Closely Held Corporations Is Similar to the Duty of
Partners in a Partnership
[*P16] Under the revised business code, HN9^d\rectors
and officers are required to carry out
their corporate duties in good faith, with prudent care, and in the best interest of the corporation.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-840 (2005). These corporate duties have been interpreted to coincide
with the common law understanding that officers and directors owe these duties to the
corporation and shareholders collectively, not individually. Aurora [**154] Credit Servs., 970
P.2d at 1280 (indicating that actions for breach of a fiduciary duty generally belong to the
corporation). In this case, however, McLaughlin urges us to apply a different standard—the
partnership standard. HNX0^if] contrast to the general standard for corporate duties, the
statutory partnership standard of care has been interpreted to require the utmost good faith
between individual partners. Ong, Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 453-54
(Utah 1993) ("Normally partners 'occupy [***15] a fiduciary relationship and must deal with
each other in the utmost good faith.'" (quoting Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah
1982)); Nelson v. Matsch, 38 Utah 122, 110 P. 865, 868 (Utah 1910) ("[Pjartners stand in a
fiduciary relation to each other, and that[]is the duty of each partner to observe the utmost good
faith towards his copartners in all dealings and transactions that come within the scope of the
partnership business."); Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18 (2007).
[*P17] Whether to modify the fiduciary duty standard in closely held corporations is an issue of
first impression for this court. Numerous other states have considered the question, and; we look
to their analyses and to the Corporation Act's language and structure to guide our determination.
See Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91, P 17, 991 P.2d 584 (indicating that
in the absence of Utah precedent, the court looks to Utah statutes and "case law from other
jurisdictions for guidance").
[*P18] McLaughlin urges us to follow the partnership-like duty standard originally articulated
by Massachusetts courts and subsequently adopted by several other states. Beginning with
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975),
[***16] Massachusetts changed the landscape of duties owed by shareholders in close
corporations. Relying on (1) the resemblance between close corporations and partnerships, (2)
the need for trust and confidence in such companies, and (3) the inherent risk of loss due to
shareholders' inability to recoup their investments, the Massachusetts court imposed on close
corporation shareholders the same duties owed by partners—utmost good faith and loyalty to all
shareholders of the corporation. Id. at 515. Compared to the fiduciary duty owed by directors
and stockholders of public corporations, the court found this duty to be "more rigorous" than the
"somewhat less stringent" corporate duty of "good faith and inherent fairness." Id. at 515-16.
The Donahue court explained, "stockholders in close corporations must discharge their
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management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith standard.
They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty
to the other stockholders and to the corporation." Id. at 515. The Massachusetts courts have
repeatedly upheld and applied this standard. See O'Brien v. Pearson, 449 Mass. 377, 868 N.E.2d
118, 124 (Mass. 2007); [***17] Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 402 Mass. 650, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853
(Mass. 1988); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663
(Mass. 1976). The Donahue standard has also been adopted by other jurisdictions. Hollis v. Hill,
232 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that Donahue's "recognition of special rules of
fiduciary duty applicable to close corporations has gained widespread acceptance."); Orchard v.
Coveili, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1559 (W.D. Pa. 1984). ("The duty of utmost good faith and loyalty in
the context of closely[]held corporations has been recognized by a number of courts confronting
similar fact situations.").
[*P19] The defendants, however, urge this court to follow the minority position, which has
been adopted by Delaware and Texas. The minority position narrowly construes the duties of
shareholders in a closely held corporation and differentiates between a person's status as
employee and shareholder. In Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, for example, the Delaware Supreme
Court noted that Delaware had not adopted Massachusetts' approach to fiduciary duties, but
instead imposed identical duties on shareholders of closely held corporations and public
corporations. 683 A.2d 37, 39 n.2 (Del. 1996); [***18] accord Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d
472, 488 (Tex. App. 1997) ("[A] co-shareholder in a closely held corporation does not as a
matter of law owe a fiduciary duty to his co-shareholder."). Additionally, the Delaware Supreme
Court distinguished between the [**155] plaintiff's rights as a stockholder and his contractual
rights as an employee. Riblet Prods. Corp., 683 A.2d at 40. While the court noted the Riblet
plaintiff had not alleged that his termination amounted to a wrongful freeze-out of his stock
interest, in subsequent cases where the plaintiff has made such allegations, other courts
following Delaware's approach have determined that any injury caused by a termination decision
would only be an injury to an individual's employment interests and not to his interests as a
stockholder. Berman v. Physical Med. Assocs., Ltd., 225 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 2000). At least
one court has described this approach as being more predictable because it treats all
corporations the same way. Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 383-84 (7th
Cir. 1990) (comparing Ohio's Donahue fiduciary duty standard for close corporations to
Delaware's traditional standard). The Delaware approach thus stands [***19] in sharp contrast
to the fiduciary duty standard followed by the majority of states.
[*P20] Presented with two divergent approaches, we must assess which approach best suits
Utah's corporate law scheme. Our Corporation Act does not provide explicit guidance, as it does
not directly address close corporations or duties between shareholders. However, considering the
Act as a whole and its specific provisions together, such as the duties imposed on directors and
the dissolution remedy explicitly outlined, Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-840, -1430(l)(b), we
believe it is apparent that the legislature intended to protect shareholders from oppression and
misconduct by those in control. To construe the Act's provisions to require the same fiduciary
duties for publicly held and closely held corporate shareholders would not adequately protect
close corporation shareholders. This is because the Model Business Code, on which the Utah
Corporation Act was based, was developed largely in the context of publicly held corporations and
the common law surrounding their governance. See Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. Introduction
(2009) ("[T]he Model Act does not geenerally distinguish between publicly held and privately
[***20] held corporations." Additionally, the Model Act "was amended in 1990 and 2006 "to
provide greater certainty and more flexibility to non-public corporations.); See also F. Hodge
O'Neal, Robert B. Thompson, & Blake Thompson, O'Neal & Thompson's Close Corporations and
LLCs: Law and Practice § 9:21 (3d ed. 2004) ("Courts recognize that the usual default rules of
corporate law affect close corporations differently from large publicly held corporations . . . .").
Close corporations differ, however, in significant ways, and when these differences result in
undesired outcomes, we have interpreted the Corporation Act in a way that achieves the intent
and goal of the Act as a whole. This is a trend followed by many courts. See Melrose v. Capital
City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Ind. 1998) ("Courts have traditionally interpreted
fiduciary duties differently for closely[]held corporations as opposed to publicly held corporations
for which most of the statutory norms were established.").
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[*P21] As discussed in Angel Investors and Aurora, the form of closely held corporations
subjects shareholders to distinct challenges in protecting their investment. These core
characteristics, and other common [***21] elements, lead to what has been referred to as the
close corporation trap. James M. Van Vliet, Jr. & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty
Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. III. U. L. Rev. 239,
242 (1998); see also F. Hodge O'Neil, Robert B. Thompson, & Blake Thompson, O'Neal and
Thompson's Close Corporations and LLCs: Law and Practice § 9:2 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that a
close corporation shareholder "does not have a partner's power to dissolve the enterprise and get
out" and similarly does not have the "exit option" of selling her shares in a securities market
available to shareholders of publicly held corporations). Shareholders in close corporations lack a
ready market for their shares. This means that closely held corporation shareholders have no
liquidity in their shares, see Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 ("No outsider would knowingly assume
the position of the disadvantaged minority."), and have no avenue for price discovery other than
the costly process of acquiring an independent valuation for the company. Without an available
market in which to sell their [**156] interest in a company, minority shareholders who
disagree with the direction [***22] or governance of the close corporation must rely on
contractual or statutory remedies, which are often nonexistent, impractical, or inadequate. Id.
This, in effect, leaves the shareholder with no remedy for the abuses and oppression that may
result due to the small number of shareholders, the frequency of familial and other personal
relationships, and the likelihood that majority shareholders control the board in close
corporations. Though the Act provides for dissolution, this is often a drastic remedy that may not
serve the interest of the complaining shareholder and certainly not the corporation of which he is
a part owner.
[*P22] Without a market remedy, shareholders in close corporations are easily subjected to
freeze outs, squeeze outs, and other forms of oppression, which the Corporation Act aims to
prevent. Thus, the Massachusetts approach of recognizing broader fiduciary duties in closely held
corporations better achieves the goals of the Act by stemming shareholder oppression and is the
appropriate standard for evaluating fiduciary relationships among shareholders in a closely held
corporation. Our adoption of the Massachusetts standard is a logical extension of our existing
case [***23] law regarding close corporations, which acknowledges the unique nature of such
corporations and seeks to protect their shareholders by interpreting the Corporation Act with
different corporate circumstances in mind. By adopting this broader fiduciary obligation for close
corporation shareholders, alternative remedies exist for oppressed shareholders, 4 such as an
equitable claim for dissolution or a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
FOOTNOTES
j 4 At the time Donahue was decided, Massachusetts did not have a statutory remedy for
! oppression. Many of the states that have followed suit have enacted minority oppression
; statutory remedies—usually dissolution—but allow distinct actions for breaches of the
I Donahue duties. See e.g., Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 2002 NMCA 15, 131 N.M. 544,
40 P.3d 449, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) ("[Djrawing on our partnership case law, we hold that j
\ breach of this fiduciary duty can be asserted as an individual claim separate from the
remedies available under our statutory corporate law for oppressive conduct."); Balvik v.
Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388-89 (N.D. 1987) (holding that statute governing corporations
allowed "alternative equitable remedies not specifically stated in the statute"); Baker v.
; Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Ore. 614, 507 P.2d 387, 395 (Or. 1973) [***24] ("[C] I
; ourts are not limited to the remedy of dissolution, but may, as an alternative, consider other j
i appropriate equitable relief.").

[*P23] Having concluded that ^ " ^ s h a r e h o l d e r s in closely held corporations owe their
coshareholders fiduciary obligations, we now consider whether the Defendants breached these
duties in this case.
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B. A Shareholder Violates His Duty of Utmost Good Faith When He Thwarts Another
Reasonable Expectations of Benefits Derived From Ownership in the Corporation

Shareholder's

[*P24] " ^ ^ B r e a c h e s of the fiduciary duty owed by close corporation shareholders arise in
several circumstances, the facts of which commonly overlap. These circumstances have been
identified as unequal treatment, frustration of reasonable expectations of involvement, and a
freezeout or squeezeout. James M. Van Vliet, Jr. & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty
Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. III. U. L. Rev. 239,
252 (1998). In all cases there is a common element—a shareholder's investment expectation in a
close corporation is frustrated by another shareholder's actions. Brodie v. Jordan, 447 Mass. 866,
857 N.E.2d 1076, 1079-80 (Mass. 2006) (noting that examples of breaches of [***25] duty
share the common element of majority shareholders frustrating minority shareholders'
reasonable expectation of benefit from their ownership of shares); Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder
Oppression v. Employment At Will in the Close Corporation: The Investment Model Solution,
1999 U. III. L. Rev. 517, 520-21 (1999) (arguing that investment model "reconciles the doctrines
of shareholder oppression and employment at will"); James M. Van Vliet, Jr. & Mark D. Snider,
The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap,
18 N. III. U. L. Rev. 239, 252 (1998).
[**157] [*P25] Analyzing breach of fiduciary claims in this light, courts have narrowed the
potentially broad duty espoused by Donahue to a more investment-based analysis. Brodie, 857
N.E.2d at 1079 (Mass. 2006) ("A number of other jurisdictions . . . also look to shareholders'
'reasonable expectations' in determining whether to grant relief to an aggrieved minority
shareholder in a close corporation."). For example, beginning again with Massachusetts, in Wilkes
v. Springside Nursing Homes, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Court described the termination
of an officer from the close corporation as a squeezeout [***26] that "effectively frustrate[d]
the minority stockholder's purpose in entering on the corporate venture and also den[ied] him an
equal return on his investment." 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). The Wilkes
court then explained the importance of balancing a shareholder's expectations with the
reasonable and legitimate business interests of the other shareholders. Id. "Therefore, HN13
Twhen minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit . . . alleging a breach of the strict
good faith duty," courts "must carefully analyze the action taken by the controlling stockholders
in the individual case" and ask "whether the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate
business purpose for its action." Id.
[*P26] Under this standard for fiduciary duty protection, the termination of an employee is not
always a breach of fiduciary duty. See Merola v. Exergen Corp., 423 Mass. 461, 668 N.E.2d 351,
354-55 (Mass. 1996). In Merola the court found the plaintiff's termination was not a breach of
fiduciary duty because the plaintiffs investment in the corporation was not tied to employment in
any formal way. Id. Comparing the facts in Merola to the facts in Wilkes, the court noted that in
Wilkes the policy and practice [***27] of the corporation was to divide the profits of the
corporation equally by way of salaries to the shareholders who participated in the operation of
the corporation. This distribution of the company's resources was based on the fact that under
the corporation's long-standing policy, employment with the corporation went "hand in hand with
stock ownership." Id. at 354. The corporation in Merola, on the other hand, had no such policy.
And, while the plaintiff may have expected continued employment, the value of his shares were
independent of his employment status. Id. This was evidenced by the fact of the increase in the
value of his stock and a lack of indication that he was required to purchase stock to keep his job.
Id. The court also noted the plaintiff was not a founding member of the corporation, a fact
considered by other courts as well. Id.
[*P27] f / / V i 4 ? " N o t every discharge of an at-will employee of a close corporation who happens
to own stock in the corporation gives rise to a successful breach of fiduciary duty claim." Id. at
355. Instead, the court must consider the formal policies and practices of the close corporation,
and how these policies and practices are interpreted by and impact [***28] all shareholders to
determine whether or not a shareholder's reasonable expectations were thwarted. As the North
Dakota Supreme Court has explained, when considering an allegation of oppressive conduct, a
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court should review
what the majority shareholders knew, or should have known, to be the petitioner's
expectations in entering the particular enterprise. Majority conduct should not be
deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner's subjective hopes and desires in
joining the venture are not fulfilled. Disappointment alone should not necessarily be
equated with oppression.
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987) (quoting Matter of Kemp & Beatiey, Inc.,
64 l\LY.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)); see also Fox v.
7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929, 933 (Mont. 1982). This close consideration of
shareholders' expectations is necessary to ensure that corporations are not crippled and kept
from efficiently operating their business; it is well accepted that corporate officers "must have a
large measure of discretion . . . in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding whether to merge
or consolidate, establishing the salaries of corporate officers, dismissing directors with or
[***29] without cause, and hiring and firing corporate employees." Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
[**158] [*P28] Applying the foregoing principles to this case, we conclude that Cookietree
did not thwart McLaughlin's investment expectation. McLaughlin was not a founding member who
created the company with the expectation of employment. Instead, after the corporation wras
well established, McLaughlin was recruited for his specialized experience in similar industries. His
primary reason for joining Cookietree was employment. This employment allowed him to
purchase stock in Cookietree, but he was not required to do so. And, while it is likely that his
initial stock purchase allowance and the later stock purchase agreement were offered as an
incentive or reward for McLaughlin's work performance, the purchase allowances were not
inextricably tied to his employment; they were a separate investment in the company. In
addition to his stock purchases, and unlike the plaintiff in Wilkes, McLaughlin was paid a
competitive salary for his contributions to the company. His investment in the company was
separately rewarded through the payment of dividends, which he continued to receive after his
termination. Therefore, in terminating [***30] McLaughlin, Schenck 5 did not thwart
McLaughlin's investment expectations in the company and therefore did not violate any duty
owed to McLaughlin.
FOOTNOTES
5 The district court found that Cookietree, not Schenck, terminated McLaughlin's employment, !
and therefore, Schenck was not liable for any damages caused by terminating McLaughlin.
This was incorrect. Schenck terminated McLaughlin as the president of Cookietree and is
; liable if in doing so he breached a fiduciary duty, including his duty to discharge both his
I "management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith
j standard." Wilkes, 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976) (quoting Donahue, 328 j
N.E.2d at 515)); see also Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, P 19, 70 P.3d 35 \
("[A]n officer or director of a corporation is not personally liable for torts of the corporation or
j of its other officers and agents merely by virtue of holding corporate office, but can only incur
; personal liability by participating in the wrongful activity.") (quoting 3A William Meade
Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1137, at 209 (rev. ed.
2002)).

[*P29] McLaughlin also argues that Rosemann and Schenck breached [***31] the fiduciary
duty they owed to McLaughlin by transferring and later ratifying the stock transaction between
Anna Schenck and Greg Schenck. This allegation is dependent, however, on McLaughlin's claim
that the transfer was unlawful; all stock transactions promote the parties' interests, and
therefore only breach a duty when they are accomplished in an unfair or unlawful manner.
Therefore, we next consider whether the stock transaction violated Cookietree's corporate charter
or the Corporation Act.
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II. THE SCHENCK TRANSACTION DID NOT VIOLATE THE CORPORATE CHARTER OR THE
CORPORATION ACT, BUT THE WAIVERS WERE TAINTED BY A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
[*P30] The 1991 and 1999 shareholder agreements limit the transfer of shares by imposing
first rights of refusal on any share transfer. If a shareholder wishes to sell or otherwise transfer
his shares, the shareholder must first offer Cookietree the opportunity to purchase the shares. If
Cookietree declines to purchase the stock, then the corporation's shareholders have a right to
purchase a portion of the offered shares equal to the percentage of the company's shares they
already own. Under the agreements, "[a]ny sale or transfer . . . shall be null and [***32] void
unless the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are strictly observed and
followed." The limitation on share transfers may be waived by a "duly authorized action of
[Cookietree's] Board of Directors, or by the Shareholders, upon the express written consent of
the owners of at least two-thirds of the Shares . . . (excluding those Shares owned by the selling
shareholder)."
[*P31] The transfer of shares from Anna Schenck to Greg Schenck did not conform to the first
right of refusal provision; therefore it was void unless the waivers by the Board and three of
Cookietree's shareholders were valid. McLaughlin argues that the ratification of the Schenck
transaction was invalid because the waivers were based on an expired Shareholder Agreement,
were untimely, violated Cookietree's bylaws, and, in the case of the Board waiver, was a
conflicting interest transaction under the Corporation [**159] Act. We disagree that the
waivers were enacted without authority, were untimely, or were in violation of Coookietree's
bylaws or of statutory conflict of interest provisions. However, we acknowledge the waivers were
tainted by a conflict of interest and thereby remand for a determination of whether
[***33] they were fair.
[*P32] First, the stock transaction between Anna and Greg Schenck is subject to the 1991
Shareholder Agreement. McLaughlin argues that the waivers were invalid because the initial
transaction occurred when the 1991 Shareholder Agreement was in effect but the waiver
occurred after the Agreement was superseded by the 1999 Agreement. Where there was no
lapse between the two agreements, there was no such contractual no-mans land. The share
transfer and waiver were part of the same transaction and are governed by either the 1991
Agreement or the 1999 Agreement, both of which provide for a waiver of the agreement's
limitations on share transfers. In this case, the transaction occurred in August 1999 and the 1999
Shareholder Agreement became effective in November 1999. Therefore, the 1991 Agreement is
the controlling document. Whether the waiver was invalid because it was acquired so long after
the share transfer is an issue of timeliness, not authority.
[*P33] Pursuant to the Corporation Act, the waiver was timely. McLaughlin argues the waivers,
obtained over six years after the stock transfer, could not have been timely as a matter of law,
and therefore the issue should have been submitted [***34] to a jury. McLaughlin is correct
that whether or not ratification actually occurred is a question of fact. However, he fails to cite
any disputed issues of fact that would have prevented the district court from determining the
question as a matter of law on summary judgment. There is no dispute that the waivers were
obtained, nor is there a challenge to the date of the waivers or the involved parties. HN15*+Untier
the Corporation Act, the waivers are effective as of the date indicated by the board of directors in
the waiver and consent. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-821(2); see also 2A William Meade Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 782 (rev. ed 2009). McLaughlin relies on agency
law to argue that the Board should not be allowed to execute the waiver and consent after so
much time had elapsed because it would be unfair and disadvantageous to him. To persuade this
court to adopt such an equitable principle, McLaughlin must present a developed common law
principle or a strong policy reason to support its adoption. He has not argued either. Therefore,
we rely on the plain language of the Corporation Act, which allows the board to act retroactively
by assigning ex post-facto [***35] effective dates to their actions. As presented to the district
court, McLaughlin did not present any disputed fact that would foreclose the district court from
determining as a matter of law that the waivers were timely.
[*P34] Additionally, the waivers did not violate Cookietree's bylaws. McLaughlin argues the
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shareholder waiver violated Cookietree's bylaws because the shareholders signed the waivers
without a noticed shareholder meeting, and that an action taken without a meeting must be
signed by all the shareholders entitled to vote, whereas he and his wife were not asked to sign.
The shareholder waiver, however, is governed by the 1991 Shareholder Agreement, which does
not require the votes of all shareholders entitled to vote, but instead only two-thirds of the
shareholders. While this may conflict with the bylaws, HN16+the Corporation Act allows a
corporation to enter a separate shareholder agreement that governs the management and affairs
of the corporation and the relationships among the shareholders despite a conflict with the
bylaws so long as it does not violate public policy. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732. Therefore,
because the shareholder agreement allowed two-thirds of Cookietree's [***36] shareholders to
waive provisions of the shareholder agreement without a shareholder meeting, the waivers did
not violate Cookietree's bylaws.
[*P35] Turning to the Corporation Act, we hold the waivers were not statutory conflict of
interest transactions within its terms. McLaughlin argues the waivers were conflict of interest
transactions because each [**160] of the board members that signed the waiver had a conflict
of interest. We agree with Greg Schenk's argument that the statute does not apply. Under the
Corporation Act, HN17m¥a person is considered to have a conflict of interest if he has an interest
in "a transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the corporation or by any entity in which
the corporation has a controlling interest." Id. § 16-10a-850(l) (emphasis added). In this case,
the statute does not apply to the waiver because it was not itself a transaction. As explained by
the comments to the Model Business Corporation Act, which the Utah Revised Business
Corporation Act adopted, a transaction is a two-sided deal, not a unilateral action by the
corporation. Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. ch. 8-F, introductory cmt. (2009). The waiver, as enacted
by the board of directors, was a unilateral [***37] action by Cookietree, not a "deal";
therefore, it is not subject to the conflict of interest statute. Id.
[*P36] This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis. H i V i 8 ? M M a n y situations arise in
which a director's [or shareholder's] personal economic interest is or may be adverse to the
economic interest of the corporation, but which do not entail a 'transaction' by or with the
corporation." Id. These situations are no less concerning because on the surface they appear to
suffer from the same lack of probity and fair dealing as statutory conflict of interest transactions.
The law does not ignore such troubling circumstances, but instead leaves the treatment of such
situations "for development under the common law." Id. The Model Act suggests the procedures
designed to deal with statutory conflicts of interest provide a useful strategy for dealing with such
situations as a matter of common law. Id. We agree. 6
FOOTNOTES
6 The statutory conflict of interest provisions address the same concerns presented by
nontransaction conflicts of interest. Nontransaction conflicts of interest, however, are much
less common in publicly held corporations and therefore because the Corporation Act was
drafted in the context [***38] of such corporations, see supra P 20, it fails to address such
situations.

[*P37] The procedures provided in the conflict of interest statute most appropriately address
nontransaction-related conflict situations because they do not automatically invalidate conflict of
interest transactions but instead require the party with a conflict to show the transaction was
fair, or require the vote of disinterested board members or disinterested shareholders to ratify
the transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851 (2005). In adopting these procedures for
nontransaction-related conflicts, we recognize that many aspects of corporate governance are
unfair. However, as close corporation case law repeatedly notes, close corporations are ripe for
abuse and oppression of minority shareholders, especially when majority shareholders are
commonly both directors and board members. The conflict of interest statute protects against
such abuse, but still preserves the ability of close corporations to operate by not invalidating
every transaction with a conflict of interest.
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[*P38] Applying this standard, we conclude the waivers ratifying the 1999 share transfer were
tainted by a conflict of interest because they were both [***39] executed by Greg Schenck,
who clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer restrictions of the shareholder
agreement that were ignored when he received the shares by which he gained majority control of
Cookietree. By waiving the restrictions on the share transfers, Schenck and the other board
members and voting shareholders deprived the company and the nonvoting shareholders of the
economic opportunity to increase their investment in the corporation. Corporate law is wary of
such self-dealing. Cookietree's shareholder agreement also was wary of such activities and
excluded sellers from voting on waiving the restrictions on share transfers. The agreement failed,
however, to foresee the possible conflicts presented when a buyer is already a corporate
shareholder and votes to waive the restrictions on share transfers. We therefore remand for a
determination of whether the waivers were fair within the meaning of Utah Code section 16-10a851, which is a fact-intensive inquiry focusing on whether the waivers were beneficial to the
corporation and the shareholders and whether they satisfied the standard of fair dealing. See
Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. ch.8-F, § 8.60.
[**161] III. A [***40] TRIAL COURT MAY DENY A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND WHEN
THE AMENDMENT WAS FUTILE
[*P39] In its Ruling and Order, the district court did not dismiss McLaughlin's fiduciary duty
claim but rejected the grounds on which he pled the claim, leaving open the opportunity to
amend the complaint so long as he met the burden of alleging new facts and evidence that would
support a claim of breach of fiduciary duty that had not already been addressed by the court.
When McLaughlin submitted an amended complaint that added two additional parties but relied
on largely the same facts, the district court denied this motion.
[*P40] HN19li?\Nhen considering a motion to amend, the district court should primarily consider
whether the motion would cause unavoidable prejudice to the opposing party. Aurora Credit
Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Utah 1998). In addition, the district
court may also consider "delay, bad faith, or futility of the amendment." Id. In this case, the
district court correctly held that McLaughlin's proposed amended complaint would have been
futile as the court already determined that interparty contracts barred the existence of any duty
owed to McLaughlin in relation to the complained [***41] of acts. A party cannot obtain a
different outcome by adding to the parties or rephrasing claims.
[*P41] McLaughlin argues the district court had only ruled on fiduciary duties arising out of
existing contracts and that his amended complaint raised tort-based theories of fiduciary duties.
This is an inaccurate characterization of the district court's determination and, moreover, a
distinction without a difference. Regardless of how McLaughlin phrases his claims, they are the
same theory: Cookietree shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to McLaughlin by waiving the
right of refusal for the 1999 stock transaction and by terminating his employment. Whether this
theory is characterized as arising out of contract or tort, it is the same theory--a tort for breach
of duty. Thus, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion because McLaughlin's
amendment failed to state new facts or a new theory that had not already been addressed by the
court; an amendment would have been futile.
CONCLUSION
[*P42] We agree with McLaughlin that shareholders in close corporations stand in fiduciary
positions to one another and are required to act with the utmost good faith. However, we also
note this duty [***42] is not unlimited but instead must be balanced with the legitimate
business interest of the corporation and the reasonable expectations of individual shareholders.
In this case, however, we hold that McLaughlin's reasonable expectations were not thwarted
when he was terminated from Cookietree, and therefore, the defendants did not breach any
fiduciary duties owed him. The district court's decision on this issue is affirmed. Additionally, we
affirm the district court's decision to deny McLaughlin's attempt to amend his complaint to add
additional parties as futile because he could not prove his legal theory by adding individuals to
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the litigation. Finally, we conclude that the waivers ratifying the 1999 share transfer were
contaminated by a conflict of interest and remand for a determination of whether the waivers
were fair.
[*P43] Associate Chief Justice Durrant • , Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish ^, and District Judge
Hadfield • concur in Chief Justice Durham Vs opinion.
[*P44] Having disqualified himself, Justice Nehring • does not participate herein; District: Judge
Ben H. Hadfield * sat.
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iMINUTES OF A MEETING
OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS III
COOKIETREE, INC.
Friday, December 18,2009

•

\ meeting of the board of directors (the "Board") of Cookietree, Inc., a Utah corporation
(the "Company"), was held on Friday, December 18,2009, commencing at 4:00 p.m. MST at the
offices of Ballard Spahr, LLP, 201 South Main Street, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
Present at and participating in the meeting were all three members of the Board, Greg F. Schenk,
Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. Rudd. Also present was Brian R. Innes, the Company's
corporate legal counsel, Mr, Schenk acted as chairman of the meeting. Mr. Rosemann acted as
secretary of the meeting and asked Mr. Innes to prepare these minutes.
Each of the directors waived notice of the time, place, and purposes ofthe meeting to
which he might have been entitled and consented to the conduct of the business of the meeting.
un

•

.

'•

i*dj ig to oi der.

The 1999 Stock Transfer From Anna Schenk to Crcg Schenk
I he directors discussed the sale of 545^200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company
by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that took place in August 1999 (the "Stock Sale") and the
waiver in 2005 of the provisions, including the stock transfer restriction provisions (other than
paragraph 10) of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement between the Company and the shareholders
of the Company who signed the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement that was authorized by the Board
~in 2005 (the "2005 Board Waiver") and the separate written waiver of such provisions executed
in 2005 by certain shareholders of the Company. In that context, the directors discussed the Utah
Supreme Court opinion in the litigation brought against the Company and others, including Greg
Schenk, by Sam McLaughlin. The directors noted that the Utah Supreme Court held that both
waivers were tainted because Greg Schenk had a conflict of interest and participated in the
giving of each of the waivers. Because of the action of the I Ftah Supreme Comt, the directors
unanimously determined that it is advisable for the board to consider whether to ratify the 2005
Board Waiver and to authorize and approve a new waiver of the provisions, including the stock
transfer restriction provisions (other than paragraph 10) of the 1991 Shareholders5 Agreement,
and to the extent applicable, the similar provisions of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement
between the Company and the shareholders of the Company to the Stock Sale.
111 the course the directors' discussion of the matter, Greg Schenk acknowledged the
personal benefit that he would receive from the ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver arid from
the authorization and approval of a new waiver and that said personal benefit created for him a
conflict of interest. Greg Schenk stated that because of that conflict of interest he intended to
abstain from voting on any action concerning the ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver and the
authorization of a current waiver.
Harold Rosemann stated that although he did not believe that his status as an employee of
the Company would exert any influence on his vote as a director, he did acknowledge that his
relationship with Greg Schenk likely could have an influence on his vote and create a conflict of
SallUkc-506876.1 0061604-00003
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f

interest for him in voting. Therefore, Harold Rosemann stated that because of that conflict of
interest he also intended to abstain from voting on the issue of the ratification of the 2005 Board
Waiver or the authorization of a current waiver.
i

Following a detailed discussion concerning the matters before the directors, David Rudd,
the sole disinterested member of the Board, acknowledged that he, like the other directors, had
received and reviewed the disclosure document describing the facts and circumstances
surrounding the 20O5 Board Waiver and the issues associated with authorizing a new waiver and
also acknowledged that he was otherwise aware of the details of the conflict of interest of Greg
Schenk. The directors determined to put the matter of the ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver
and the issue of whether to authorize and approve a current waiver of the provisions, including
the stock transfer restriction provisions (other than paragraph 10) of the 1991 Shareholders'
Agreement, and to the extent applicable, the similar provisions of the 1999 Shareholders1
Agreement to the Stock Sale before the disinterested director and in that regard it was:
RESOLVED: That the directors acknowledge the full disclosure by Greg Schenk
of his non-transactional conflict of interest with respect to past or present action
taken or to be taken by the Board by and on behalf of the Company to ratify the
waiver by the Board in 2005 (by written consent dated effective as of August 15,
2005) on behalf of the Company of the provisions, including the stock transfer
provisions (other than paragraph 10), of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreements to
the August 1999 sale by Anna Schenk of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of
the Company to Greg Schenk (the "Stock Sale") or concerning any action by the
Board to presently act by and on behalf of the Company to waive such provisions
in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent applicable in the 1999
Shareholders'Agreement.
-

-

RESOLVED, FURTHER: That the disinterested director ratifies and confirms
in all respects the action of the directors by and on behalf of the Company taken
by their written consent effective as of August 15, 1999 to waive the application
of the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement (in particular the stock
transfer limitation provisions (other than paragraph 10)) to the Stock Sale.
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That the disinterested director presently waives, bv
and on behalf of the Company, the application of the provisions of the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement, in particular the stock transfer provisions (other than
paragraph 10) and, to the extent applicable, the provisions of the 1999
Shareholders' Agreement, in particular the stock transfer provisions (other than
paragraph 10), to the Stock Sale.

Greg F. Schenk and Harold W. Rosemann abstained from voting on the foregoing
resolutions and David R. Rudd voted in favor of the resolutions.
Ratification of Action by the Sole Disinterested Director
The directors discussed the advisability of the entire Board considering and to the extent
appropriate ratifying the actions concerning the ratification of the 2005 Board Waiver and the
authorization of a new waiver of the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, in
particular the stock transfer provisions (other than paragraph 10) and, to the extent applicable,
SaliLake-506876.10061604-00003
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the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, in particular the stock transfer provisions
(other than paragraph 10), to the Stock Sale and to that end following a discussion, unanimously:
RESOLVED: That all actions taken by David R. Rudd, in his capacity as a
director of the Company, to ratify the waiver by the Board in 2005 (by written
consent dated effective as of August 15,1999) on behalf of the Company of the
provisions, including the stock transfer provisions (other than paragraph 10), of
the 1991 Shareholders' Agreements to the Stock Sale be and are ratified and
confirmed in all respects.
RESOLVED, FURTHER: I hat all actions taken by David R. Rudd, in his
capacity as a director of the Company, to presently waive, on behalf of the
Company, application of the provisions, including the stock transfer provisions
(other than paragraph 10), of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreements, and to the
extent applicable in the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement to the Stock Sale, be and
are ratified and confirmed in all respects.
^nareholders
Tlit: <iiru-;i)rs discussed the need to hold the 2009 annual meeting of the shareholders of
the Company and unanimously agreed that it is advisable to establish the date, time, location and
record date for the annual meeting and to that end \ inanini- msly:
RESOLVED That the 2009 annual rneeuny. *i -i<- shareholders of the Company
is called for and shall be held at 4:00 pin M> ! > i January 6, 2009, at the offices
of Stoel Rives, LLP, One I huh Center, 20 !
Mil \ I -n Street, Suite ! 100, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111.
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That the matters of business to come ocioic r.h- .. y
annual meeting of the shareholders of the Company shall be (i) the election
three directors to the Board of Directors of the Company, (ii) ratification of the
appointment ot 1aiiiier LC as the auditor of the Company, (iii) waiver of the
application of the provisions, including the stock transfer provisions (other than
paragraph 10), of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and to the extent applicable
of the similar provisions of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement to the Stock Sale
by the shareholders of the Company, (iv) ratification of the waiver contemplated
in (iii) above and the waiver executed in 2005 by certain of the then shareholders
of the Company of the provisions, including the stock transfer provisions (other
than paragraph 10), of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreements to the Stock Sale and
of the waiver, if any, by the shareholders of the Company at the annual meeting
who own ''qualified shares" of the application of the provisions, including the
stock transfer provisions (other than paragraph 10), of the 1991 Shareholders'
Agreement and to the extent applicable of the similar provisions of the 1999
Shareholders' Agreement to the Stock Sale; and (v) any other business that
properly conies before the meeting.
RESOLVED, FURTHER: I hat shareholders of the Company of record as of
the close of business on December 18, 2009 (the "Record Date"), shall be the only
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shareholders of the Company entitled to notice of and to vote at the 2009 annual
meeting of the shareholders.
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That the Secretary of the Company be, and he is,
authorized, empowered, and directed to send notice and other relevant
information to the shareholders as of the Record Date, and to solicit proxies from
them on behalf of the Board of Directors for the meeting, such notice and other
relevant information to be mailed on a date in compliance with the bylaws of the
Company and applicable law.
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That if any officer of the Company shall determine
that it is necessary and reasonable to change any or all of the date, time or
location of the 2009 annual meeting of the shareholders of the Company, each
such officer shall be, and is, authorized, empowered, and directed to make such
changes and to take all of the actions that are necessary or advisable to fully
implement any such changes.
Nomination of Candidates for Election to the Board of Directors
The directors discussed the appointment of candidates for election to the Board at the
2009 annual meeting of the shareholders. It was noted in the discussion that the terms of Greg F.
Schenk, Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. Rudd will expire at the 2009 annual meeting.
Following a discussion, the directors unanimously agreed that it is advisable and in the best
interests of the Company that Greg F. Schenk, Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. Rudd be
nominated as candidates for election as a director of the Company to serve as such until the 2010
annual meeting of the shareholders and until their successors are duly elected and to that end the
directors unanimously:
RESOLVED: That each of Greg F. Schenk, Harold W. Rosemann, and David R.
Rudd be and each of them is nominated to stand as a candidate of the Company
for election as a director to the board of directors of the Company to serve as
such, if elected, until the 2010 annual meeting of shareholders of the Company
and until his successor is duly elected.
Selection of Auditor
The directors discussed the work done by the auditor of and independent accountants to
the Company, and unanimously selected Tanner LC as such for the fiscal year ending September
30, 2010, and determined that it was advisable to submit the selection of Tanner LC as the
Company's auditors to the shareholders for ratification at the 2009 annual meeting of the
shareholders of the Company, and that that end unanimously:
RESOLVED: That Tanner LC be and is selected as the auditor of and
independent accountants to the Company for the fiscal year ending September 30,
2010.
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That the selection of Tanner LC as the auditor of and
independent accountants to the Company for the fiscal year ending September 30,
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2010 be submitted to the shareholders for ratification at the 2009 annual meeting
of the shareholders of the Company.
Appointment of Inspector of Election/Voting
Following a discussion, die directors unanimously agreed to appoint Harold W.
Rosemann as the inspector of election/voting and judge for the 2009 annual meeting of the
shareholders of the Company and to that end unanimously;
RESOLVED: That for the 2009 annual meeting of the shareholders of the
Company and for all meetings of the shareholders of the Company held during
2010, Harold W. Rosemann be and is appointed to act as the inspector of
election/voting and, in such capacity, to serve as the judge for the voting,
including the tabulation of the results of any votes by the shareholders of the
Company at any si ich meetings.
Omnibus Resolutions
In furtherance of the lore

directors unanimously:

RESOLVED: That all actions heretofore taken and expenses incurred by any
officer or director of the Company in furtherance of any of the actions authorized
by the foregoing resolutions are hereby ratified, confirmed, adopted and
approved, in all respects.
RESOLVED, FURTHER: That each of the officers of the Company be, find is,
authorized, directed, and empowered in the name of and on behalf of the
Company, to execute, certify, deliver, file and record such other agreements,
instruments, certificates and other writings, and to take such actions as such
officer may deem necessary or advisable to carry out the intent and purposes of
the foregoing resolutions, such determination to be conclusively evidenced by
such action, execution, certification, delivery, filing or recording.
Adjournment of Meeting
[here being no further business to come before the meeting n
unanimously approved, adjourned at approximately 4:20 p.m. MST.

-j.

T^

Harold W, Rosemann
Secretary
ATTEJ

'ureg F. Jichenk
President
SaitUkc-506876.1 006i604-00003
5 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.*

/

;

December 21, 2009

Dea r Shai eholder,

I have enclosed the notice of the 2009 annual shareholders meeting that will be held
«MI January 6, 2010, a disclosure document explaining two special proposals that will
be voted on at the meeting and a proxy for those not able to attend the meeting in
person If applicable, please return the proxy as soon as possible. Please note that you
should have already received a copy of the audited financial statements and your
Schedule K-1 for the Fiscal Year ending September 30, 2009.
Thank von !<•? \ i •» T IK!|\ «' •,«, «IJ have any questions please call me.
Sincerely,

I laroic

\

<i'^v\*vi\\

(Corporate Secretary
Cookietree, Inc.

: ), iltl aki : 503019,5 0061604-00002
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COOKIETREE, INC.
4122 South 500 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123

NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS
TO BE HELD ON JANUARY 6, 2010
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Annual Meeting of the Shareholders of Cookietree,
Inc., a Utah corporation (the "Company"), will be held at the offices of Stoel Rives, LLP located at
One Utah Center, 201 South Main Street, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on Wednesday,
January 6, 2010 at 4:00 P.M. local time, for the following purposes:
L

To elect the three members of the Company's Board of Directors.

2.

To ratify the selection of Tanner LC as the independent auditor for the Company.

3.
To consider waiving the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, and to the
extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions
(other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company by
Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in April 1999 ("Proposal 1").
4.
To consider ratifying (1) the waiver by the Shareholders of the Company on May 17,
2005 of the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement; and (2) the present waiver by the
Shareholders of the Company as contemplated by Proposal 1 above of the provisions of the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement,
including the stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the
Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in April 1999
("Proposal 2").
5.
To transact such other business as may properly come before the Annual Meeting or
any adjournment or adjournments of the Annual Meeting.
Holders of record at the close of business on December 18, 2009 (the "Record Date"), are entitled to
notice of and to vote at the Annual Meeting. The number of outstanding shares on the Record Date
was 4,124,650.
A form of proxy ("Proxy") is enclosed with this notice. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO ATTEND
T H E ANNUAL MEETING AND VOTE IN PERSON, PLEASE COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE EXNCLOSED
PROXY AND RETURN IT PROMPTLY IN THE ENCLOSED REPLY ENVELOPE.
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A valid Proxy will be voted at the Annual Meeting in accordance with the instructions in the
Proxy. If you execute a Proxy and are able to attend the .Annual Meeting, you may. if you wish,
revoke the Proxy and vote personally on all matters brought before the Annual Meeting. Your
Proxy may be revoked through written notification to Harold W, Rosemann, the Secretary of the
Company, by executing a Proxy bearing a later date, or by attending the Annual Meeting and
affirmatively electing to vote in person. A Shareholder who attends the Annual Meeting need not
revoke his or her Proxy and vote in person unless he or she wishes to do so.
The Annual Meeting may be adjourned from time to time as the Shareholders present n lay
determine.

i>r)|
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:>' • , | ^
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^/A^t r A < ^ r
Harold W. Rosemann
Corporate Secretary
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INFORMATION STATEMENT CONCERNING PROPOSALS 1 AND 2
•

t

The following information is provided to the Shareholders of the Company to enable
them to better evaluate and determine how to vote on Proposals 1 and 2 at the Annual Meeting.
Background
Greg Schenk and his father, Boyd Schenk, were among the original shareholders of
Cookietree, Inc. (the "Company"). Greg Schenk is currently the President of the Company, a
member of the Company's Board of Directors (the "Board"), and owns a majority of the issued
and outstanding shares of the Common Stock (the "Common Stock") of the Company. Anna
Schenk was married to Boyd Schenk at the time of his death and is Greg Schenk's stepmother.
On or about March 9, 1991, Boyd Schenk was issued stock certificate 11 representing
1,363,200 shares of the Common Stock. On March 26, 1998, Boyd Schenk surrendered
certificate 11 to the Company, which cancelled the certificate, and the Company issued
replacement certificates 17 and 18 representing 818,000 shares and 545,200 shares of the
Common Stock, respectively, to Boyd Schenk. On April 1, 1998, Boyd Schenk transferred the
818,000 shares of the Common Stock represented by certificate 17 to Greg Schenk.
On November 28, 1998, Boyd Schenk died. At the time of his death, Boyd Schenk
owned the 545,200 shares of the Common Stock represented by certificate 18 and those shares
became part of the estate of Boyd Schenk. On or about August 16, 1999, approximately nine
months after Boyd Schenk's deathr Anna Schenk^olithe 545,200 shares of the Common Stock:
represented by certificate 18 (the "Boyd Schenk Shares'') to Greg Schenk for $272,600 pursuant
to a Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement (the "Stock Sale").
The 1991 Shareholders' Agreement
On January 28, 1991, the then shareholders of the Company, including Boyd and Greg
Schenk, executed a Shareholders' Agreement (the "1991 Shareholders' Agreement"). A copy of
the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement is attached as Exhibit A. Among other things, the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement governed the conditions upon which a Shareholder could transfer his
or her shares. Paragraph 2 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement granted a right of first refusal in
favor of the Company and the other Shareholders in the event a Shareholder elected to sell some
or all of his or her shares of the Common Stock. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement, the Company would have 30 days following its receipt of the notice of
intent to sell within which to purchase some or all of the shares specified in the notice at a
purchase price determined as provided in paragraph 7 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement. If
the Company decided not to purchase all of the shares, the Shareholders were then given the
option to purchase their pro rata portion of the shares not purchased by the Company.
The 1991 Shareholders' Agreement contains two exceptions to the share transfer
restrictions mentioned in the above paragraph. The first of the two exceptions, found in
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paragraph 9 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, allows Shareholders to transfer their shares of
the Common Stock to members of their immediate family.
rhe second exception is found in paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement,
vi hit/h reads as follows;
.
The provisions of this Agreement may be waived with respect to any transfer
either by Cookietree, upon duly authorized action of its Board of Directors, or by the
Shareholders, upon the express written consent of the owners of at least two-thirds of
the Shares then subject to this Agreement (excluding those Shares owned by the
selling Shareholder).
The McLaughlin Litigation
On or about November 24, 2004, Sam McLaughlin filed a lawsuit in the Third District
Court in Salt Lake County (the "McLaughlin Lawsuit") against Greg Schenk, the Estate of Boyd
Schenk, Anna Schenk, and the Company (collectively, the "Defendants") in which he alleged,
among other allegations, that the Stock Sale was made in violation of the transfer restriction
provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and that the Stock Sale was a "director's
conflicting interest transaction" as defined in section 851 of the Utah Revised Business
Corporation Act (the "Business Corporation Act").1
The 2005 Waivers
On May 17, 2005, the Board adopted a resolution by means of a unanimous written
consent of the members of the Board concerning the Stock Sale, rhe resolution waived the
application of all restrictions on transfer in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, except the
restriction in Paragraph 10, (the Transfer Restriction Provisions") to the Stock Sale. On May
17, 2005, the then owners of more than two-thirds of the shares of the Common Stock subject to
the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, excluding the Boyd Schenk Shares previously owned by
Anna Schenk, executed a Waiver and Consent that waived the application of the Transfei:
Restriction Provisions to the Stock Sale.
On the basis of the May 17, 2005 action by the Board and by the then Shareholders of the
Company who owned greater than two-thirds of the shares of the Common Stock subject to the
1991 Shareholders1 Agreement (collectively, the "2005 Waivers"), Greg Schenk took the
position that the transfer and sale by Anna Schenk to him of the Boyd Schenk Shares was not in
violation of the 1991 Shareholders'Agreement.

1 Sam McLaughlin had also initiated other lawsuits against the Company. Some of the claims in the McLaughlin
f awsiijt were resolved by arbitration between the Company and Mr. McLaughlin.

S.-M •*
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Continuation of The McLaughlin Litigation
After the execution of the 2005 Waivers, Sam McLaughlin claimed in the McLaughlin
Lawsuit that the 2005 Waivers were invalid because Greg Schenk voted for the 2005 Waivers
and had a conflict of interest. The Defendants moved for Summary Judgment in the trial court
on the basis that, among other things, the Stock Sale was not in violation of the 1991
Shareholders Agreement because the Transfer Restriction Provisions had been validly waived.
The trial court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Sam McLaughlin
appealed the decision of the trial court to the Utah Supreme Court where he argued, among other
things, that the 2005 Waivers were invalid because they were based on an expired shareholders'
agreement (the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement was replaced in 1999 by a new Shareholders'
Agreement (the "1991 Shareholders' Agreement)), were untimely, violated the Company's
bylaws, and, in the case of the action taken by the Board on May 17, 2005 by unanimous written
consent, was a conflicting interest transaction under Part 8 of the Business Corporation Act. On
October 2, 2009, the Utah Supreme Court tiled its opinion. A copy of the full opinion is attached
as Exhibit B.
The Utah Supreme Court held that the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement controlled the
Stock Sale and that pursuant to the Business Corporation Act the 2005 Waivers were timely.
(Opinion of the Utah Supreme Court dated October 2, 2009 (the "Opinion") atffif33, 34.) The
Utah Supreme Court also held that the 2005 Waivers did not violate the Company's bylaws and
that neither of the 2005 Waivers constituted a "director's conflicting interest transaction" under
the Business Corporation Act. (Opinion atffl[34, 35.) However, the Utah Supreme Court
determined that the 2005-Waivers-t - were-tainted by a confl ictof interest because they were both
executed by Greg Schenk, who clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer
restrictions of the [1991] shareholders'] agreement. . . ." (Opinion at 1j 38.)
Greg Schenk's Conflict of Interest
As noted, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the 2005 Waivers were "tainted by
[Greg Schenk's] conflict of interest" and thus ineffective to waive the application of the Transfer
Restriction Provisions to the Stock Sale because Greg Schenk executed each of them when "he
clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer restrictions of the [1991]
shareholders'] agreement." (Opinion at ^j 38.) The 2005 Waivers were executed on May 17,
2005 and as indicated, at that time Greg Schenk had a conflict of interest in seeking the 2005
Waivers because of his economic interest in having the Transfer Restriction Provisions waived as
concerns the Stock Sale.
Resolution of the Conflict of Interest by Director Action or by Shareholder Action
As previously noted, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in the McLaughlin Lawsuit that
neither of the 2005 Waivers constituted a "director's conflicting interest transaction." (Opinion
at If 35.) The Court so ruled because under the Business Corporation Act neither of the 2005
Waivers "was itself a transaction." (Opinion at f 35). However, the Court stated that the Model
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Business Corporation Act (the "Model Act"), on which the Business Corporation Act was based,
suggests that the procedures in the Model Act for dealing with a director's conflicting interest
transaction provide a useful approach for resolving a director's nontransactional conflict of
interest, such as the conflict of interest of Greg Schenk, as a matter of common law. (Opinion at
Tf 36.) Thus, the Utah Supreme Court said that:
The procedures provided in the conflict of interest statute most appropriately
address nontransaction-related conflict situations because they do not automatically
invalidate conflict of interest transactions but instead require the party with a conflict
to show the transaction was fair, or require the vote of disinterested board
members or disinterested shareholders to ratify the transaction. (Emphasis
added.) (Opinion at 137.)
Greg Schenk has requested that the Board and the Shareholders vote on whether or not to
waive the Transfer Restriction Provisions, pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders'
Agreement and sections 852 and 853 of the Business Corporation Act \t the Annual Meeting,
the Shareholders will be asked to (1) ratify the May 17, 2005 action of the then shareholders of
the Company and the new waiver of the Transfer Restriction Provisions of the Stock Sale; and
(2) execute a present waiver of the Fransfer Restriction Provisions with respect to the Stock Sale
At a meeting of the Board held on December 18, 2009, a majority of Hie "disinterested"
members of the Board has previously taken action to ratify the 2005 Board Waiver and to
presently waive the Fransfer Restriction Provisions, as concerns the Stock Sale, and the Board
recommends the..adoption- bythe Shareholders^ f-Proposals-1 and 2.
Although sections 852(3) and 853(2) permitted or permit Greg Schenk to be present at
the meeting of the Board and the meeting of the Shareholders at which the matters referred to
above were or are to be voted on and to vote as a member of the Board and as a Shareholder of •
the Company, respectively at those meetings, and Greg Schenk was in attendance at the
December 18, 2009 meeting of the Board, Greg Schenk abstained from voting at the meeting on
the matters referred to in the above paragraph. Greg Schenk intends to be present at the Annual
Meeting and to vote the Shares of the Common Stock owned by him, other than the Boyd
Schenk Shares, onl> on Proposal 1. Greg Schenk will not vote on Proposal 2.
" *>i HiUiH! SM.AP I •' iVith Respect to Proposals 1 and 2.
Because of his conflict of interest in seeking waiver of the Transfer Restriction
Provisions, and because the Transfer Restriction Provisions in the 1991 Shareholders'
Agreement and in the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement require that a such a waiver be approved
by "the owners of at least two-thirds of the shares then subject to this Agreement (excluding
those Shares owned by the selling Shareholder)," Proposal 1 will be approved only if it is
approved by (1) Shareholders owning a majority of the Shares of the Common Stock that
constitute "qualified shares" under the Business Corporation Act; and (2) by the owners of at
least two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding shares of the Common Stock as of the
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Record Date, excluding the Boyd Schenk Shares. Proposal 2 will be approved only if it is
approved by Shareholders owning a majority of the Shares of the Common Stock that
constitute "qualified shares" under the Business Corporation Act.
"Qualified shares" is defined in section 102(27) of the Business Corporation Act to
include all shares of the Common Stock entitled to vote on Proposals 1 and 2 "except a share:
(a) that, to the knowledge, before the vote, of the secretary, other officer, or agent of the
[Company] authorized to tabulate votes [in the case of the Company at the Annual Meeting,
Harold W. Rosemann, the secretary of the Company], is beneficially owned; or (b) the voting
of which is controlled, by: (i) a director who has a conflicting interest respecting [Proposal 1
or 2]; (ii) a related person of that director2:; or (iii) a person referred to in . . . (i) and (ii).w
As noted, Greg Schenk has been determined to have a conflict of interest with respect to
Proposals 1 and 2. Therefore, to the extent the vote of the Shareholders on Proposals 1 and 2
is intended to approve the Stock Sale in spite of that conflict of interest, each of the proposals
must be approved by the owners of a majority of the shares of the Common Stock without
taking into account any of such shares owned by Greg Schenk and his vote on either of the
proposals. A list of the owners of the shares of the Common Stock that are "qualified shares"
will be available at the Annual Meeting and at the offices of the Company for not less than ten
days preceding the date of the Annual Meeting.
Paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and of the 1999 Shareholders'
Agreement requires that any waiver of the provisions of either such agreement given by the
Shareholders must be given by athe express written consent of the owners of at least twothirds of the Shares^then-subject-to- this Agreement (exeluding^hose-Share^owned bjrthe
Selling Shareholder)." Therefore, to constitute a waiver by the Shareholders of the Transfer
Restriction Provisions in the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and to the extent applicable in the
1999 Shareholders' Agreement3, Proposal 1 must be approved by not less than two-thirds of
all of the issued and outstanding shares of the Common Stock (excluding the Boyd Schenk
Shares).
Consequences if the Board and the Shareholders Determine not to Waive the Provisions of
the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement With Respect to the Stock Sale
Paragraph 12 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement provides as follows:
Any sale or transfer, or purported sale or transfer, of Cookietree Shares shall
be null and void unless the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement are
strictly observed and followed.
2 Section 102(31) of the Business Corporation Act defines "related person" to include "(a) the spouse of the
director; (b) a child, grandchild, sibling, or parent of the director; (c) the spouse of a child, grandchild, sibling, or
parent of the director; (d) an individual having the same home as the director; (e) a trust or estate of which the
director or any other individual specified in this Subsection (31) is a substantial beneficiary; or (0 a trust, estate,
incompetent, conservatee, or minor of which the director is a fiduciary,"
3 The stock transfer restrictions in the 1991 and 1999 Shareholders' Agreements are the same.
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In its opinion in the McLaughlin Lawsuit, the Utah Supreme Court stated that at the time
the Stock Sale was made, "it violated the 1991 Shareholders'] Agreement." (Opinion at If 6.) If
the Board and the Shareholders were to determine to take none of the actions requested by Greg
Schenk (referred to above and outlined in greater detail below) and if Greg Schenk determined
not to attempt otherwise to show that the 2005 Waivers were fair within the meaning of section
851 of the Business Corporation Act or having attempted to do so was unsuccessful in that effort,
the Stock Sale would be null and void and of no effect, the Boyd Schenk Shares would be
returned by Greg Schenk to Anna Schenk, and appropriate financial arrangements would be
made and entered into between Greg Schenk and Anna Schenk as a result of the of the undoing
of the Stock Sale,
.
PROPOSAL 1
PRESENT WAIVER OF THE TRANSFER RESTRICTION PROVISIONS IN THE 1991
SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT AND THE 1999 SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT
Effect of a Present Waiver
Paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and the 1999 Shareholders'
Agreement gives the Shareholders (other than the selling Shareholder) the right to waive the
application of the agreement to a sale or transfer of shares of the Company. You should vote
"For" Proposal 1 if you believe that it is appropriate that the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders'
^greenLent,^
including, in each case, the stock transfer restrictions of the agreement (other than Paragraph 10)
should not apply to the Stock Sale and you are willing to execute the written consent referred to
ii i Paragraph 11 of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement. In
deciding how to vote, you should consider, among other things, whether waiving the Transfer
Restriction Provisions would be fair to the Company and the Shareholders.
It a piesent waiver is approved, Greg Schenk will be allowed to keep the Boyd Schenk
Shares sold to him in the Stock Sale, the Stock Sale will not he null and void and the Boyd
Schenk Shares v-i" . -c • cturned to Anna Schenk.
necommendation of Board of Directors
Approval of Proposal 1 requires the affirmative vote of a majonty of the qualified shares
and the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of all the issued and outstanding shares of the
Common Stock, excluding the Boyd Schenk Shares.
The Disinterested V

Si
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*)] Directors recommends a vote FOR Proposal 1.
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PROPOSAL 2
RATIFICATION OF THE MAY 17, 2005 AND PRESENT 2010 SHAREHOLDER
WAIVER OF THE APPLICABLE TRANSFER RESTRICTION PROVISIONS IN THE
1991 AND 1999 SHAREHOLDERS'AGREEMENTS
Effect of Ratification of the 2005 and 2010 Shareholder Waivers
The Shareholders who hold qualified shares of the Company's Common Stock are being
asked to vote to ratify (1) the May 17, 2005 waiver by the then Shareholders of the application of
the Transfer Restriction Provisions to the Stock Sale (the "2005 Shareholder Waiver"); and (2)
the present waiver of the Transfer Restriction Provisions in the 1991, and to the extent
applicable, the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement (as contemplated by Proposal 1) to the Stock Sale
(the "2010 Shareholder Waiver"). You should vote "For" Proposal 2 if you believe that it is
appropriate that the Transfer Restriction Provisions in the 1991, and to the extent applicable, the
1999 Shareholders' Agreement should not apply to the Stock Sale. In deciding how to vote, you
should consider, among other things, whether the 2005 Shareholder Wavier and the 2010
Shareholder Waiver of the Transfer Restriction Provisions are fair to the Company and the
Shareholders.
If the 2005 Shareholder Waiver and the 2010 Shareholder Waiver are ratified Greg
Schenk will be allowed to keep the Boyd Schenk Shares sold to him in the Stock Sale, the Stock
Sale will not be null and void and the Boyd Schenk Shares will not be returned to Anna Schenk.
Vote Requirement and Recommendation
Ratification of both the 2005 Shareholder Waiver and the 2010 Shareholder Waiver
requires the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares of the Common Stock of the Company
that are qualified shares.
The Disinterested Member of the Board of Directors recommends a vote FOR Proposal 2.
OTHER BUSINESS
The Board of Directors is not aware of any matters to be presented at the Annual Meeting
other than those described herein and in the accompanying Proxy. However, the enclosed Proxy
gives discretionary authority to the management of the Company to vote on any other matters
that properly come before the Annual Meeting.
SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTIONS
If you will not be able to attend the Annual Meeting in person and wish to vote on the
above matters, or if you will attend the Annual Meeting and wish to give your proxy to
management of the Company, please complete, date, and sign the enclosed Proxy and return it in
the enclosed envelope.
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EXHIBIT A
1991 SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT
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OPINION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
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PROXY
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SHAREHOLDERS
JANUARY 6, 2010
THIS PROXY IS SOLICITED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The undersigned hereby appoints Harold W. Rosemann, with full power of substitution,
as attorney and proxy of the undersigned to vote and otherwise represent all of the shares of the
Common Stock of Cookietree, Inc., a Utah corporation (the "Company"), registered in the name
of the undersigned at the Annual Meeting of Shareholders to be held at the offices of Stoel Rives,
LLP located at One Utah Center, 201 South Main Street, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah on
Wednesday, January 6, 2010 at 4:00 P.M. and any adjournments thereof, with the same effect as
if the undersigned were present and voting the shares on all matters set forth in the Notice and
Information Statement, a copy of which has been received by the undersigned, as follows:
1.

The election of the following nominees as directors of the Company, each to serve until
the next Annual Meeting of Shareholders or until a successor shall be duly elected and
qualified, or until their earlier resignation or removal.
Greg F. Schenk

[ ] For

[ ] Against

[ ] Abstain

JQawdJUGLiidcL

{ | For

f } Against

—f—}-A bstairr

Harold W. Rosemann [ ] For

[ ] Against

[ ] Abstain

To ratify the appointment of Tanner LC as the independent auditor for the Company.
[ ] For

[ ] Against

[ ] Abstain

To waive the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent
applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions
(other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the
Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in April 1999 ("Proposal 1").
[ ]For

[ ] Against

[ ] Abstain

To ratify (1) the waiver by the Shareholders of the Company on May 17, 2005 of the
provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement; and (2) the present waiver by the
Shareholders of the Company as contemplated by Proposal 1 above of the provisions of
the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent applicable, of the 1999
Shareholders' Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph
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10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk
to Greg Schenk that occurred in April 1999 ("Proposal 2").
[ ] For

[ ] Against

[ ] Abstain

My proxy is further authorized to vote such shares "For" or "Against" any other matter or
proposal that properly comes before the Annual Meeting, or any adjournment or adjournments
thereof as he, in his sole discretion may determine. I ratify and confiirm all acts my proxy may do
or cause to be done by virtue of this proxy and I revoke all proxies previously given by me for
any meeting of the shareholders of the Company.
WHEN PROPERLY EXECUTED AND DELIVERED, THIS PROXY WILL BE
VOTED IN THE MANNER DIRECTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED SHAREHOLDER. IF NO
DIRECTION IS MADE, THIS PROXY WILL BE VOTED TO ELECT THE THREE
DIRECTORS, TO RATIFY THE APPOINTMENT OF TANNER LC AND FOR PROPOSALS
1 AND 2. THIS PROXY WILL BE VOTED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE PROXY IF
OTHER MATTERS PROPERLY COME BEFORE THE MEETING.
Dated:
(Signature of Shareholder)
Dated:
(Signature of Additional Shareholder,
ifjointly held)—

—

Exact Name(s) of Shareholders(s)
(Please print)
Please sign your name exactly as it appears on your stock certificate. A corporation is requested
to sign its name by its President or other authorized officer, with the office held designated. If
shares are held jointly, each holder should sign. Executors, trustees, and other fiduciaries
should so indicate when signing. Please sign, date and return this Proxy immediately.
SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD SIGN AND RETURN
THIS PROXY PROMPTLY TO :
COOKIETREE, INC.
Attention: Harold W. Rosemann
PO Box 57888
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-0888
PLEASE RETURN BOTH PAGES OF THIS PROXY
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MINUTES OF THE 2009 ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF
COOKIETREE, INC.
January 6, 2010
4:00 P.M.
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah
The 2009 Annual Meeting of die Shareholders of Cookietree Inc., a Utah corporation (the
"Company"), was held at the above date, time and place in accordance with notice duly provided
to all of the shareholders of the Company (the "Shareholders") of record on December 18, 2009.
Greg F. Schenk, the President of the Company, a member of the Company's Board of
Directors, and the chair of the meeting called the meeting to order. Harold W. Rosemann,, the
Secretary of the Company, reported that a Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders was duly
given to all Shareholders of the Company in accordance with the requirements of Utah law and
the Bylaws of the Company. Said notice, together with a Proxy for the Annual Meeting of
Shareholders and an Information Statement, were mailed on December 22, 2009 to ail
Shareholders of record on December 18, 2009 ( the "Record Date")- The Notice of Annual
Meeting, the Proxy for Annual Meeting of Shareholders, and the Information Statement are
incorporated in these minutes by reference and are attached hereto.
The Annual Meeting was convened for the purpose of considering and voting on the
matters set forth in the Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders, the Proxy for Annual Meeting
of Shareholders, and the Information Statement provided-tathe- Shareholders Mr. Schenk asked—
Mr. Rosemann to confirm that a sufficient number of the shares of the Common Stock of the
Company (the "Common Stock") was represented at the meeting, in person or by proxy, to
constitute a quorum so that the meeting could be duly convened for the transaction of business.
After reviewing the proxies received and the shares held by the Shareholders in attendance at the
meeting, Mr. Rosemann announced that of the 4,124,650 shares of the Common Stock issued
and outstanding on the Record Date, 4,113,400 shares were either represented in person or by
proxy at the meeting. A majority of the outstanding shares of the Common Stock being
represented in person or by proxy at the meeting, Mr. Schenk declared a quorum present and the
Annual Meeting of the Shareholders duly convened for the purpose of transacting business.
Election of Directors
Mr. Schenk stated that the first order of business to come before the meeting was the
election of directors. Mr. Schenk noted that the Company's Board of Directors had nominated
three persons to serves as directors, namely himself, Harold W. Rosemann and David R. Rudd.
Mr. Schenk then asked if there were any other nominations. Margaret Olson and Lincoln Hobbs,
the attorneys and proxies for Sam and Kimberly McLaughlin, respectively nominated Sam and
I
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Kimberly McLaughlin to serve on the Board of Directors. Mr. Schenk asked if there were any
other nominations and there being none, ballots for the election of directors were circulated,
marked and then tabulated by Mr. Rosemann. Mr. Rosemann announced the votes to be as
follows: 3,173,400 votes for each of Greg F. Schenk, Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. Rudd,
and 400,000 votes for each of Sam McLaughlin and Kimberly McLaughlin. Mr. Schenk
announced that Greg F. Schenk, Harold W. Rosemann, and David R. Rudd had been elected to
serve on the Company's Board of Directors.
Approval of Tanner LC
Mr. Schenk then stated that the next order of business to come before the meeting was the
approval of Tanner LC as the Company's independent auditors for fiscal year 2010 and then
opened the matter for discussion. Lincoln Hobbs, as proxy for Kimberly McLaughlin, and
Margaret Olson, as proxy for Sam McLaughlin, both objected to ratifying the appointment of
Tanner LC. Following the discussion, ballots were circulated, marked, and then tabulated by Mr.
Rosemann. Mr. Rosemann announced that 3,173,400 votes were cast in favor of ratifying the
appointment and 400,000 shares were voted against ratifying the appointment. Mr. Schenk
announced that based on the vote the Shareholders had:
RESOLVED, that Tanner LC be approved as the Company's independent
auditors for fiscal year 2010.
Shareholder Waiver (Proposal 1)
Mr. Schenk then stated that the next order of business to come before the meeting was
the proposal (/'Proposal 1") that the Shareholders waive the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders'
Agreement, and to the extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, including the
stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common
Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999. Mr.
Schenk then opened the matter for discussion. During the discussion, Margaret Olson and
Lincoln Hobbs as proxy, respectively for Sam McLaughlin and Kimberly McLaughlin, objected
to Proposal 1. Following the discussion, ballots were circulated, marked and then tabulated by
Mr. Rosemann. Mr. Rosemann announced that 3,168,200 shares were voted in favor of Proposal
1 and 400,000 shares were voted against Proposal I (the 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of
the Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999 were not voted).
Mr. Rosemann also reported that of the "qualified shares" of the Common Stock held by the
Shareholders present or represented by proxy at the meeting, 987,000 "qualified shares'' were
voted in favor of Proposal 1 and 400,000 "qualified shares" were voted against Proposal 1. Mr.
Schenk announced that based on the vote the Shareholders had:
RESOLVED, that the Shareholders hereby waive the provisions of the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders'
Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 10), to
the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk
2
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to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999.
Shareholder Ratification (Proposal 2)
Mr. Schenk stated that the next order of business to come before the meeting was the
proposal ("Proposal 2") that the Shareholders who hold "qualified shares" ratify (1) the waiver
by the Shareholders of the Company on May 17, 2005 of the provisions of the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement; and (2) the present waiver by the Shareholders of the Company, as
contemplated by Proposal 1, of the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement, and to the
extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions
(other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company
by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999. Mr. Schenk then opened the
matter for discussion. Margaret Olson and Lincoln Hobbs as proxy, respectively for Sam and
Kimberly McLaughlin objected to Proposal 2. Following the discussion, ballots were circulated,
marked and then tabulated by Mr. Rosemann. It was noted that Greg Schenk did not vote on
Proposal 2. Mr. Rosemann announced that of the "qualified shares" of the Common Stock held
by the Shareholders present or represented by proxy at the meeting, 987,000 "qualified shatres"
were voted in favor of Proposal 2 and 400.000 "qualified shares" were voted against Proposal 2.
Mr. Schenk announced that the based on the vote the Shareholders holding "qualified shades"
had:
RESOLVED, that the Shareholders hereby ratify (1) the waiver by the
Shareholders of the Company on May 17, 2005 of the provisions of the 1991
Shareholders' Agreement; and (2) the present waiver by the Shareholders of the
Company as contemplated by Proposal I of the provisions of ihe 1991
Shareholders' Agreement, and to the extent applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders1
Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 10), to
the sale of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk
to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999.
After voting on the matters before the meeting, Mr. Schenk led a general discussion of
the business and provided an overview of the state of the Company. He noted the tremendous
revenue and net income growth the Company has experienced over the last five years. He also
noted that the outlook for 2010 is very positive.
There being no further business to come before the meeting, the meeting was adjourned
at 4:30 p.m.

Harold W. Rosemann
Secretary
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Attachments:
Notice of Annual Meeting,
Proxy for Annual Meeting of Shareholders,
and Information Statement
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COOKIETREB, INC,
Annual Meeting of Shareholders
January 6, 2010
CERTIFICATE AND REPORT OF
INSPECTOR OF ELECTION/VOTING JUDGE
I; the undersigned, having been duly appointed
Inspector of Election/Voting Judge for the Annual Meeting of the
Shareholders of Cookietree, Inc. (the "Company") held on January
6, 2010 (the "Meeting'*) , do hereby report:
1.

I executed my oath of office and duly delivered

the same to the Chairman of the Meeting.
2.

I inspected the shareholders' list prepared by the

Company with respect to the Meeting, and I certify that the
number of the shares of the Common Stock of the Company (the
"Common Stock") issued, outstanding, and entitled to vote at the
Meeting was 4,124,650.
3.

I recorded the Shareholders of the Company (the

"Shareholders') present at the Meeting, in person or by proxy,
and the number of the shares of the Common Stock owned by them
and I certify that there were present at such meeting, in person
or by proxy, Shareholders owning 4,113,400 shares of the Common
Stock.
4.

I tallied the number of the shares of the Common

Stock voted by the Shareholders present at the Meeting, in person
or by proxy, on the matter of the election of directors of the
Company and I certify that Shareholders present at the Meeting
voted shares of the Common Stock held by them HForM or "Against,"
che election of directors as set forth below or abstained from
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voting also as set forth below:
Nominee

For

Greg F. Schenk

3,173,400

David R. Rudd

3,173,400

Harold W. Rosemann

3,173,400

Sam McLaughlin

400,000

Kim McLaughlin

400,000

5.

Against

Abstained

I tallied the number of the shares of the Common

Stock voted by the Shareholders present at the Meeting, in person
or by proxy, on the matter of the ratification of the selection
of Tanner LC as independent accountants to audit the financial
statements of the Company for the fiscal year ending September
30, 2010 and I certify that Shareholders present at the Meeting
voted 3,713,400 shares of the Common Stock held by them "For" and
400,000 shares of the Common Stock held by them "Against, " the
ratification of Tanner LC as independent accountants to audit the
financial statements of the Company for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2010 and no Shareholders abstained from voting.
6.

I tallied the number of the shares of the Common

Stock voted by the Shareholders present at the Meeting, in person
or by proxy, on the proposal (Proposal 1) to waive the provisions
of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement and, to the extent
applicable, of the 1999 Shareholders' Agreement, including the
stock transfer provisions (other than Paragraph 10), to the sale
of 545,200 shares of the Common Stock of the Company by Anna
Schenk to Greg Schenk that occurred in August 1999 and I certify
that (i) Shareholders present at the Meeting voted 3,168,200
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shares of the Common Stock held by them (the 545,200 shares of
the Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk
that occurred in August 1999 were not voted) "For* and 400,000
shares of the Common Stock held by them ^Against" the proposal
and no Shareholders abstained from voting on the proposal; and
(ii) Shareholders present at the Meeting voted 987,000 Hqualified
shares" of the Common Stock held by them "For" and 400,000
"qualified shares" of the Common Stock held by them "Against" the
proposal and no Shareholders owning "qualified shares" abstained
from voting on the proposal.
7.

I tallied the number of the shares of the Common

Stock voted by Shareholders present at the Meeting, in person or
by proxy, on the proposal (Proposal 2) to ratify (1) the waiver
by the Shareholders of the Company on May 17, 2005 of the
provisions of the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement; and (2) the
present waiver by the Shareholders of the Company as contemplated
by Proposal 1 of the provisions of the 1991 Shareholders'
Agreement and, to the extent applicable, of the 1999
Shareholders' Agreement, including the stock transfer provisions
(other than Paragraph 10), to the sale of 545,200 shares of the
Common Stock of the Company by Anna Schenk to Greg Schenk that
occurred in August 1999 and I certify that Shareholders present
at the Meeting voted 987,000 "qualified shares" of the Common
Stock held by them "For" and 400,000 "qualified shares" of the
Common Stock held by them "Against" the proposal and no
Shareholders owning "qualified shares" abstained from voting on
the proposal.

I certify that Greg Schenk abstained from voting
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on this proposal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have made and signed this
Certificate and Report this 6th day of January 2010.

<^^^rf<v^

sr

Harold W. Rosema;
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